Growth options, macroeconomic conditions, and the cross section of credit risk by Arnold, Marc et al.
Growth Options, Macroeconomic Conditions
and the Cross-Section of Credit RiskI,II
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 107, no. 2, pp. 350-385
Marc Arnold1, Alexander F. Wagner1,2, Ramona Westermann3
Abstract
This paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, incor-
porating the fact that rms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared to rms that
are mainly composed of invested assets, rms with growth options have higher costs of debt because
they are more volatile and have a greater tendency to default during recession when marginal utility
is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches empirical facts regarding credit spreads,
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also makes predictions about the cross-section of all these features.
Keywords: Asset composition, capital structure, credit spread puzzle, equity premium, growth
options, macroeconomic risk, value premium
IWe thank an anonymous referee whose suggestions have greatly improved the paper. Tony Berrada, Simon
Broda, Marc Chesney, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Rajna Gibson, Michel Habib, Dirk Hackbarth, Mario Hafeli, Erwan
Morellec, Gabriel Neukomm, Kjell Nyborg, Tatjana-Xenia Puhan, Alexandre Ziegler and seminar participants at the
University of Zurich, the Humboldt University of Berlin, the C.R.E.D.I.T Conference in Venice, and the Research
Day of the NCCR FINRISK provided helpful comments. This research was supported by the NCCR FINRISK, the
Swiss Finance Institute, and the Research Priority Program \Finance and Financial Markets" of the University of
Zurich.
IIJanuary 9, 2012
Email addresses: marc.arnold@bf.uzh.ch (Marc Arnold), alexander.wagner@bf.uzh.ch (Alexander F.
Wagner), ramona.westermann@unige.ch (Ramona Westermann)
1University of Zurich, Swiss Finance Institute, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
2CEPR
3University of Geneva, Swiss Finance Institute, 42 bd du Pont d'Arve, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland
1. Introduction
This paper examines the impact of corporate growth options on credit spreads, equity premiums,
rm value, and nancial policy choices in the presence of time-varying macroeconomic conditions.
The motivation for our study derives from the empirical fact that credit risk, leverage, and equity
risk premiums exhibit important cross-sectional variation. First, Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007)
show that, controlling for standard credit risk factors, proxies of growth options are all positively
and signicantly related to credit spreads. Similarly, Molina (2005) nds that rms with a higher
ratio of xed assets to total assets have lower bond yield spreads and higher ratings. Second, rms
with more growth options typically have lower leverage (see, e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Fama and
French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Third, value rms earn higher equity returns than growth
rms (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1992). Strikingly, none of these cross-sectional properties can be
explained by existing structural models of default. The reason is that these models consider rms
with only invested assets, but ignore the facts that growth opportunities constitute an essential
element of asset values and that rms are heterogeneous in their asset composition.4
We provide a model that matches these cross-sectional properties of credit risk, leverage, and
equity risk premiums. In particular, we explicitly incorporate expansion options of rms into a
structural model of default with macroeconomic risk. We show that heterogeneity in the compo-
sition of assets helps explain cross-sectional variation of credit spreads and leverage. Moreover,
allowing rms to be heterogeneous with respect to the importance of growth options in the values
of their assets explains the aggregate credit spread puzzle, not only qualitatively, but also quanti-
tatively. Importantly, the puzzle is solved while tting historically reported asset volatilities and
default rates for realistic debt maturities. At the same time, the model matches the average equity
premium and explains a signicant portion of the cross-section of equity risk (the value premium).
4Recent research focuses on the credit spread puzzle, i.e., the fact that standard structural models of default
signicantly underestimate credit spreads for corporate debt (see, e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann, 2001;
Huang and Huang, 2003). Several papers present signicant progress in solving this puzzle (see, e.g., Bhamra, Kuehn
and Strebulaev, 2010a; Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev, 2010b; Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev, 2010c; Chen, 2010;
Chen, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2009; Gomes and Schmid, 2011). However, none of these papers addresses the
cross-section of credit risk.
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It also generates a counter-cyclical value premium, as observed in the data. Finally, our model is
consistent with aggregate and cross-sectional features of default clustering, investment spikes and
busts, and recovery rates.
For our analysis, we develop a structural-equilibrium framework in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn
and Strebulaev (2010a). Thus, we embed a pure structural model of nancial decisions into a
consumption-based asset pricing model with a representative agent. Our model simultaneously
incorporates both intertemporal macroeconomic risk (building on work by Hackbarth, Miao and
Morellec, 2006; Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev, 2010b; Chen, 2010), which has been shown to be
important for explaining credit spreads and leverage, as well as expansion options. Macroeconomic
shocks to the growth rate and volatility of earnings as well as to the growth rate and volatility of
consumption arise due to switches between two states of the economy, boom and recession. The
changes in the state of the economy are modeled via a Markov chain, a standard tool to model
regime switches. The representative agent has the continuous time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil
preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1990; Due and Epstein, 1992b). Therefore, how he
prices claims depends on both his risk aversion and his elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Via the market price of consumption determined by the agent's preferences, we are able to link
unobservable risk-neutral probabilities used in the structural model to historical probabilities. This
modeling approach allows us to study endogenously the eect of macroeconomic risk on credit
spreads and optimal nancing decisions.
We allow rms to have expansion options. These options are converted into invested assets
when the underlying earnings process exceeds the investment boundary. We pinpoint the isolated
eect of a rm's asset composition on credit risk and leverage by assuming, in the main analysis,
that the exercise price of the growth option is nanced through the sale of some assets in place,
i.e., without additional funds being injected into the company. We also study equity-nancing later
in the paper. Default occurs when earnings are below the default threshold in a given regime.
Shareholders maximize the value of equity by simultaneously choosing the optimal default and
expansion option exercise policies. The capital structure is determined by trading o tax benets
of debt against default costs to maximize the ex-ante value of equity, i.e., the value of the rm.
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The rst result the model yields is that, like in other macroeconomic models, default boundaries
are counter-cyclical, i.e., shareholders default earlier in recession than in boom. Thus, default is
more likely during recession which, together with counter-cyclical marginal utilities and default
costs, raises the costs of debt for all rms compared to a benchmark model without business cycle
risk.
The central new feature of our model is that the asset composition alone matters signicantly for
the costs of debt. Two forces lead to the cross-sectional prediction that debt is particularly costly
for rms with a high portion of expansion options in their assets' values. First, because options
represent levered claims, rms with valuable growth options are more sensitive to the underlying
earnings process than rms that consist of only invested assets. The volatility of the underlying
earnings process would, consequently, underestimate the true default risk of growth rms. While
the literature discusses this basic idea within equity-nanced rms (Berk, Green and Naik, 1999;
Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino, 2006), little is known about its impact on debt prices. Our
structural model allows us to jointly analyze a rm's expansion policy and nancial leverage. We
show that the combination of these factors is critical for a full exploration of the quantitative
implications of the riskiness of growth options on credit spreads.
The second driving force is that option values are more sensitive to macroeconomic regime
changes than are assets in place. This higher sensitivity is, to some extent, another consequence
of the idea that options represent levered claims. Importantly, an additional eect derives from
the fact that the optimal exercise boundary of growth options increases in recession and decreases
in boom. Intuitively, it is optimal to defer the exercise of an expansion option when the economy
switches to recession, i.e., to wait for better times. Because the moneyness of growth options is
regime-dependent, and because options represent levered claims, the continuation value of expansion
options is more exposed to the macroeconomic state than the one of invested assets. Moreover, the
changing moneyness causes expansion options to be less sensitive to the underlying development of
the earnings process in recession than in boom, which reduces the value of the shareholders' option
to defer default during bad times. Together, these eects amplify the counter-cyclicality of default
thresholds for rms with a high portion of growth options. As marginal utility is high during bad
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times, the higher tendency to default in recession causes larger credit spreads under risk-neutral
pricing for rms with expansion options than for those with only invested assets.
We then investigate the quantitative performance of the model in explaining empirically ob-
served data. The literature suggests that an average BBB-rated rm has a ten year credit spread
in the range of 74   95 basis points (bps). (This range is obtained by starting from the average
bond yields reported in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Duee (1998), and taking into ac-
count that around 35% of bond yields are due to non-default components.) With our main set of
parameters, a model without business cycle risk produces a mere 29 bps spread for an average rm.
A standard macroeconomic model with optimal default thresholds in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn
and Strebulaev (2010b) or Chen (2010) implies a spread of 56 bps for average rms at issue that
consist of only invested assets. Our estimate for the average BBB-rated US rm's asset composition
is that total rm value is about 60% higher than the value of invested assets, which corresponds
(approximately) to a Tobin's Q of 1:6.5 For such a rm, we obtain a credit spread of about 66 bps
when using optimal default thresholds, optimal expansion boundaries, and an earnings volatility
such that the average asset volatility matches the one observed for BBB-rated rms. This spread is
remarkably higher than the 39 bps our model implies for a rm with only invested assets. Note that
the large dierence arises even though leverage is kept constant; we only vary the characteristics
of the assets themselves.
As the economy consists of a mix of rms, the result that growth rms have higher credit spreads
than rms with only invested assets suggests that our model can also explain the aggregate credit
spread puzzle. To evaluate this conjecture, note that when relating the implications of capital
structure models for average credit spreads to empirical studies, it is crucial to take into account
that such studies use aggregate data over cross-sections of rms, rather than average individual
rm level data (Strebulaev, 2007). Following this line of reasoning, Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev
(2010b) investigate how the time evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of rms with dierent
leverage ratios aects credit spreads and default probabilities. Building on their approach, we
5Market values can be higher than book values also because of o-balance sheet assets, so there is a range for the
asset composition of the \typical" rm.
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characterize the aggregate dynamics by simulating over time a cross-section of individual rms
that is structurally similar to the empirical distribution of BBB-rated rms not only with respect
to average leverage ratios but also with respect to asset composition ratios. The average ten and
20 year credit spreads of 81 and 100 basis points, respectively, from simulating this \true" cross-
section in our model reect their target credit spreads quite well. To solve the aggregate credit
spread puzzle, a model needs to explain observed costs of debt while still matching historical default
losses (given by the historical default probabilities and recovery rates), and asset volatilities. We
consequently proceed by showing that the model-implied default rates and asset volatilities of
BBB-rated rms are similar to the ones historically reported for realistic debt maturities.
The nature of assets, thus, has a powerful impact on costs of debt. Not surprisingly, it also
aects the observed features of leverage. At initiation, we nd that a rm with an average growth
option optimally holds about 4 5% lower leverage than one with only invested assets. Additionally,
we obtain pro-cyclical optimal leverage decisions of rms, in line with Covas and Den Haan (2006)
and Korteweg (2010). The reason is that the default risk is higher in recession than in boom. The
negative relationship between growth options and leverage also maintains when simulating over
time our model-implied true cross-section of BBB-rated rms. In this simulation, however, rms
deviate from their initially optimal leverage in a way such that the aggregate market leverage of the
whole sample becomes counter-cyclical, consistent with Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Bhamra,
Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b).
We derive additional testable predictions when studying the aggregate dynamics of our model
economy. Credit spreads and default rates are counter-cyclical, as reported in the literature. Next,
aggregate investment patterns are strongly pro-cyclical, with investment spikes often occurring
when the regime switches from recession to boom, reecting the ndings in the empirical investment
literature (Barro, 1990; Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power, 1999). Our model also makes specic
cross-sectional predictions. For example, realized recovery rates are lower for growth rms.
Finally, we show that the model's intuition is consistent with the literature on the value premium
for equity. In the true cross-section, our model implies an annual value premium, i.e., a dierence
between the average value-weighted equity premium of the rms in the lowest decile of the asset
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composition ratio and the premium of those in the highest decile, of 3:47%. Importantly, the model
also explains the empirically reported counter-cyclical pattern of the value premium.
Our paper contributes to several streams of previous research. First, the fact that growth options
are empirically strongly associated with observed leverage has, of course, also prompted other
explanations. The most prominent of these additional explanations, agency, comes in two primary
forms: A shareholder-bondholder conict and a manager-shareholder conict. Appealing to the
former, Smith and Watts (1992) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that debt costs associated
with shareholder-bondholder conicts typically increase with the number of growth options available
to the rm due to underinvestment (Myers, 1977) and overinvestment by way of asset substitution
(Jensen, 1986; see also Sundaresan and Wang, 2007).6 According to Leland (1998), however,
optimal leverage even increases when rms can engage in asset substitution. Similarly, Parrino
and Weisbach (1999) conclude that stockholder-bondholder conicts are too limited to explain the
cross-sectional variation in capital structure. Childs, Mauer and Ott (2005) show how short-term
debt reduces agency costs. Hackbarth and Mauer (2010) demonstrate that the joint choice of debt
priority structure and capital structure can virtually eliminate the suboptimal investment incentives
of equityholders. Neither of the papers incorporates macroeconomic risk.
As for manager-shareholder conicts, Morellec (2004) shows that agency costs of free cash ow
can explain the low debt levels observed in practice, and the negative relationship between debt
levels and the number of growth options; see also Barclay, Smith and Morellec (2006). Morellec,
Nikolov and Schurho (2012) conclude that even small costs of control challenges are sucient to
explain the low-leverage puzzle. It is still a matter of debate to what extent conicts of interest
between managers and stockholders cause the empirically observed patterns. Graham (2000), for
example, tests a wide set of managerial entrenchment variables and nds only \weak evidence that
managerial entrenchment permits debt conservatism" (p. 1931). In any case, our model is not
inconsistent with either of these views. It oers a quantitatively important reason for the cross-
6See Lyandres and Zhdanov (2010) for an explanation for accelerated investment that does not rely on agency.
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sectional variation in leverage and credit spreads that derives solely from the nature of assets of
rms.7
Second, at the core of our model is the notion that macroeconomic (business cycle) risk matters
in powerful ways for the costs of corporate debt and nancial decisions, because rms are more likely
to default when doing so is costly (see, e.g., Demchuk and Gibson, 2006; Almeida and Philippon,
2007; Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev, 2010b; Chen, 2010). What we add to this literature is the
idea that the impact of business cycle risk depends on the asset base of a rm.
In contemporaneous and independent work, Chen and Manso (2010) set up a model similar to
ours with expansion options. Their focus, however, is on the debt overhang problem, and not on
explaining cross-sectional features or the credit spread puzzle { the central tasks of this paper.
Finally, our structural-equilibrium framework draws on insights from consumption-based asset
pricing models (Lucas, 1978; Bansal and Yaron, 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up our valuation framework. We solve
the model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our parameter and rm sample choices, as well as the
optimal default and expansion policies. Section 5 outlines qualitative properties of our model for
the aggregate economy. We turn to the quantitative implications for BBB-rated rms in Section 6.
The predictions of our model for the value premium of equity are discussed in Section 7. Section 8
concludes.
2. The model
We build a structural model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, embedded inside a rep-
resentative agent consumption-based asset pricing framework. The structural model is based on
a standard continuous time model of capital structure decisions in the spirit of Mello and Par-
sons (1992), as extended by Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) for business cycle uctuations.
7An alternative explanation for why low leverage could be optimal in the high-tech sectors is oered in Miao
(2005). In his model, when a sector experiences technological growth, more competitors enter, leading to falling
prices and possibly to a greater probability of default. Yet other explanations appeal to the fact that rms have the
option to issue additional debt (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2001).
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Additionally, we explicitly model growth opportunities. Following Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev
(2010b) and Chen (2010), embedding the model of capital structure into a consumption-based asset
pricing model allows the valuation of corporate securities using the risk-neutral measure implied
by the preferences of the representative agent.
The economy consists ofN innitely-lived rms with assets in place and possibly growth options,
a large number of identical innitely-lived households, and a government serving as a tax authority.
We assume that there are two dierent macroeconomic states, namely boom (B) and recession (R).
Formally, we dene a time-homogeneous Markov chain It0 with state space fB;Rg and generator
Q :=
264 B B
R  R
375 ; in which i 2 (0; 1) denotes the rate of leaving state i: In the main analysis,
we consider B < R, as in Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006).
The following properties hold: First, the probability that the chain stays in state i longer than
some time t  0 is given by e it: Second, the probability that the regime shifts from i to j during
an innitesimal time interval t is given by it: Third, the expected duration of regime i is
1
i
,
and the expected fraction of time spent in that regime is
j
i+j
:
Aggregate output Ct follows a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion:
dCt
Ct
= idt+ 
C
i dW
C
t ; i = B;R; (1)
in which WCt is a Brownian motion independent of the Markov chain, and i; 
C
i are the regime-
dependent growth-rates and volatilities of the aggregate output. In equilibrium, aggregate con-
sumption equals aggregate output. Hence, the above specication gives rise to uncertainty about
the future moments of consumption growth.
To incorporate the impact of the intertemporal distribution of consumption risk on the represen-
tative household's utility, we assume the continuous-time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences
(Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1990), which are of stochastic dierential utility type (Due and
Epstein, 1992a,b). Specically, the utility index Ut over a consumption process Cs solves
Ut = EP
"Z 1
t

1  
C1 s   ((1  )Us)
1 
1 
((1  )Us)
1 
1    1
ds jFt
#
; (2)
8
in which  is the rate of time preference,  determines the coecient of relative risk aversion for
a timeless gamble, and 	 := 1 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for deterministic
consumption paths.
As shown by Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b) and Chen (2010), the stochastic discount
factor mt then follows the dynamics
dmt
mt
=  ridt  idWCt + (ei   1) dMt; (3)
with Mt being the compensated process associated with the Markov chain, and
ri = ri + i

   
   1

w
   1
    1

   w 1   1 ; (4)
i = 
C
i ; (5)
i = (   ) log

hj
hi

: (6)
hB; hR solve a non-linear system of equations given in the Appendix A.1, Eq. (A-1). ri are the
regime-dependent real risk-free interest rates, composed of the interest rate if the economy stayed
in regime i forever, ri, and the adjustment for possible regime switches as shown by the second
term. i are the risk prices for systematic Brownian shocks aecting aggregate output, and i is the
relative jump size of the discount factor when the Markov chain leaves state i (and, consequently,
j =
1
i
). The no-jump part of the interest rate, ri, is given by
ri = + i   1
2
 (1 + )
 
Ci
2
; (7)
and
w := eR = e B (8)
measures the size of the jump in the real-state price density when the economy shifts from recession
to boom (see Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev, 2010b, Proposition 1).
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Credit spreads are based on nominal yields and taxes are collected on nominal earnings. To link
nominal to real values such as the real interest rate introduced in the previous section, we specify
a stochastic price index as
dPt
Pt
= dt+ P;CdWCt + 
P;iddWPt ; (9)
with WPt being a Brownian motion describing the idiosyncratic price index shock, independent of
the consumption shock Brownian WCt and the Markov chain.  denotes the expected ination
rate, and P;C < 0; P;id > 0 are the volatilities of the stochastic price index associated with the
consumption shock and the idiosyncratic price index shock, respectively. The nominal interest rate
rni is then given by
rni = ri +    2P   P;Ci; (10)
with P :=
q
(P;C)2 + (P;id)
2
being the total volatility of the stochastic price index.
At any point in time, the real after-tax earnings process of a rm follows
dXt;real
Xt;real
= i;realdt+ 
X;C
i;realdW
C
t + 
X;iddWXt ; i = B;R; (11)
in which WXt is a standard Brownian motion describing an idiosyncratic shock, independent of the
aggregate output shockWCt , the consumption price index shockW
P
t , and the Markov chain. i;real
are the real regime-dependent drifts, X;Ci;real > 0 the real rm-specic regime-dependent volatilities
associated with the aggregate output process, and X;id > 0 the rm-specic volatility associated
with the idiosyncratic Brownian shock.
The nominal after-tax earnings process can now be written as
dXt
Xt
= idt+ 
X;C
i dW
C
t + 
P;iddWPt + 
X;iddWXt ; i = B;R; (12)
in which i = i;real++
P;CX;Ci;real are the nominal regime-dependent drifts, and 
X;C
i = 
X;C
i;real+
P;C > 0 the nominal rm-specic regime-dependent volatilities associated with the aggregate
output process. As suggested by the literature, we posit that X;CB < 
X;C
R (Ang and Bekaert,
2004).
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Denote the risk-neutral measure by Q: Note that the expected growth rates of the rm's nominal
after-tax earnings under the risk-neutral measure, ~i, are given by
~i := i   X;Ci
 
i + 
P;C
  P;id2 ; (13)
and let ~i denote the risk-neutral transition intensities, determined as
~i = e
ii: (14)
Following Chen (2010) and Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b), the unlevered after-tax
asset value can be written as
Vt = Xtyi for It = i; (15)
with yi being the price-earnings ratio in state i determined by
y 1i = r
n
i   ~i +

rnj   ~j

  (rni   ~i)
rnj   ~j + ~p
~p ~fj : (16)
~p := ~i + ~j is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival, and

~fB; ~fR

=

R
~p ;
B
~p

is the long-run
risk-neutral distribution. y 1 can be interpreted as a discount rate, in which the rst two terms
constitute the standard expression if the economy stayed in regime i forever, and the last term
accounts for future time spent in regime j. As in Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b), the
price-earnings ratio in the main analysis is higher in boom than in recession, i.e., yB > yR.
Finally, note that the volatility of the earnings process in regime i is
~i =
r
X;Ci
2
+ (P;id)
2
+ (X;id)
2
: (17)
The expansion option of the rm is modeled as an American call option on the earnings.
Specically, at any time t, the rm can pay exercise costs K to achieve additional future after-tax
earnings of sXt for all t  t for some factor s > 0. We assume that if a rm exercises its expansion
option, the option is converted into assets in place, such that the rm consists of only invested
assets. The exercise of the growth option is assumed to be irreversible. At default, bondholders
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recover not only a fraction of the assets in place, but also a fraction of the option's value. Intuitively,
the option can be exercised independently of the considered rm.
For the nancing of investment, we present two variants. In the main analysis, we wish to
abstract away from the eect of fund injections by debt- or equityholders to pay the exercise price,
and instead to isolate the eect of growth options in the value of rms' assets on corporate securities.
Therefore, we rst assume that, at exercise, the rm pays the exercise costs K of the option by
selling a part of its assets in place.8 In detail, while exercising the option at time t entitles the
rm to total future after-tax earnings of (s+1)Xt for all t  t, nancing the exercise costs requires
to sell a fraction KXtyi
of these earnings, in which i is the realized state of the economy at the
time of exercise. Hence, the total after-tax earnings of the rm at any point in time after exercise
correspond to

(s+ 1)  KXtyi

Xt. Second, we also consider equity nancing of the exercise costs
K.
The critical measure to capture the relative importance of a rm's expansion option in the value
of its assets is the asset composition ratio. We dene it as the value of the rm, divided by the
value of invested assets. Certainly, the value of the rm does not only contain the value of the
invested assets and the expansion option, but also the value of the tax shield and bankruptcy costs.
Nevertheless, we use this measure because the direct empirical analog of the asset composition
ratio is Tobin's Q. Furthermore, the impact of the tax shield and bankruptcy costs on the ratio is
relatively small.
Corporate taxes are paid at a constant rate  , and full osets of corporate losses are allowed. In
our framework, rms are leveraged because debt allows it to shield part of its income from taxation.
Once debt has been issued, a rm pays a total coupon c at each moment in time. Following the
standard in the literature, we assume that rms nance coupons by injecting funds. At any point in
time, shareholders have the option to default on their debt obligations, as well as the possibility to
exercise an expansion option. Default is triggered when shareholders are no longer willing to inject
8Indirect nancing by selling assets often occurs, e.g., when acquirers divest part of target companies' assets
following takeovers (Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). Of course, the model simplies
in that in reality, rms have dierent types of assets.
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additional equity capital to meet net debt service requirements (Leland, 1998). If default occurs,
the rm is immediately liquidated and bondholders receive the unlevered asset value less default
costs, reecting the absolute priority of debt claims. The default costs in regime i are assumed
to be a fraction 1   i of the unlevered asset value at default, with i 2 (0; 1]. We suppose that
recovery rates are lower in recession, i.e., R < B (Frye, 2000). The incentive to issue debt is
limited due to the possibility of costly nancial distress.
Equityholders face the following decisions: First, once debt has been issued, they select the
default and expansion policies that maximize equity value. Hence, both expansion and default
are chosen endogenously. Second, they determine the optimal capital structure by choosing the
coupon level that maximizes the value of the rm. The model does not allow restructuring of debt
neither when the option is exercised nor at endogenous restructuring points. The main reason is
that expansion opportunities preclude a scaling feature of the model solution.9
The main text presents the model and its solution for innite debt maturity. We also solve and
use the case of nite debt maturity, in which we consider the stationary environment of Leland
(1998): The rm issues debt with a constant principal p and a constant total coupon c paid at each
moment in time. A fraction m of the total debt is continuously rolled over. In particular, the rm
continuously retires outstanding debt principal at rate mp and replaces it with new debt vintages
of identical coupon and principal. Finite maturity debt is, therefore, characterized by the tuple
(c;m; p). This setup leads to a time-homogeneous setting. Throughout the paper, it is assumed
that debt is issued at par.
3. Model solution
We solve the model by backward induction. First, the value of the growth option for given
expansion policies is derived. Then, for given corporate policies and capital structure, we proceed
9The scaling property states that, conditional on the current regime of the economy, the optimal coupon, the
optimal default thresholds, the investment boundaries, as well as the values of debt and equity at restructuring
points are all homogeneous of degree one in earnings. When assuming dynamic capital structure adjustments, the
absence of a scaling property impedes not only closed-form results, but also the application of numerical solution
methods with backward induction.
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with the valuation of corporate securities for a rm that consists not only of assets in place, but also
holds an expansion option. Finally, we obtain the expansion and default policies that simultaneously
maximize the value of equity, as well as the capital structure that maximizes the rm value.
As in Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006), we assume that the optimal strategies are of regime-
dependent threshold type in X (for a formal proof in the case of expansion thresholds only, see Guo
and Zhang, 2004). Precisely, suppose that D^i and Di are the default thresholds in regime i = B;R
of a rm with only invested assets, and of a rm with both invested assets and a growth option,
respectively. Xi denotes the exercise boundary of the growth option in regime i = B;R: In what
follows, we present the case in which DB < DR; XB < XR and D^B < D^R, i.e., the boundaries are
lower in boom for both expansion and default (before and after expansion).10 Finally, we presume
that max
n
DR; D^R
o
< XB, i.e., we are interested in rms that exercise their expansion option with
a positive probability, and we exclude the possibility of immediate default after expansion. The
optimal default and expansion policies for relevant parameter regions satisfy this ordering.
3.1. The value of the growth option
Denote the value functions of the growth option in regime B and R by GB(X) and GR(X),
respectively. The following proposition states the value of a growth option subject to regime
switches.
Proposition 1. For any given pair of exercise boundaries [XB; XR], the value of the growth option
in regime i is given by
Gi(X) =
8><>:
Ai3X
3 + Ai4X
4 X < XB; i = B;R
C1X
R1 + C2X
R2 + ~R
syBX
rnR ~R+~R
  ~R KrnR+~R XB  X < XR; i = R
sXyi  K X  Xi; i = B;R;
(18)
in which k; k = 3; 4; are the positive roots of the quartic equation
~R +
1
2
~2R(   1)  ~R   rnR

~B +
1
2
~2B(   1)  ~B   rnB

= ~R~B; (19)
10Note that we can assume without loss of generality that DB < DR (if not, interchange the names of the regimes).
The case DB < DR; D^B < D^R; and XB > XR, (i.e., the exercise boundary in recession is lower than the one in
boom) can be solved by analogous techniques.
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and Rk ; k = 1; 2; are given by
R1;2 =
1
2
  ~R
~2R

vuut1
2
  ~R
~2R
2
+
2

rnR +
~R

~2R
: (20)
ARk, k = 3; 4; is a multiple of ABk with the factor
lk :=
1
~B
(rnB +
~B   ~Bk   1
2
~2Bk(k   1)): (21)
AB3; AB4; C1; C2

solve a linear system given in Appendix A.2.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The functional form of the solution (18) is analogous to the one presented in Guo and Zhang
(2004). For each regime i, the option is exercised immediately whenever X  Xi (option exercise
region); otherwise it is optimal to wait (option continuation region). We remark that, similar to
the occurrence of default, there are two possible ways of triggering the exercise of the expansion
option: Either when the idiosyncratic shock X reaches the exercise boundary Xi in a given regime,
or when the regime switches from recession to boom and X lies between XB and XR.
In the option continuation region, the solution (18) reects the changes in value that occur
either when the idiosyncratic shock reaches a boundary, or when the regime switches. Proposition
1 shows that in the region X < XB, i.e., the case in which the option is in the continuation region
in both boom and recession, these value changes are captured by two terms. When the option is
in the continuation region in recession only, i.e., XB  X < XR, the solution exhibits four terms.
These four terms reect the value changes when leaving this region due to hitting a boundary, either
XR from below or XB from above, or due to a regime-switching induced exercise of the option. In
the option exercise region, X  Xi, the rm obtains earnings of sX by investing K.
Proposition 1 determines the value of the growth option for any given pair of exercise boundaries
XB and XR. In the full model solution, we derive option values for optimal exercise boundaries
of equityholders in both levered and unlevered rms. In unlevered rms, the optimal exercise
boundaries are denoted XunlevB and X
unlev
R , respectively. They are determined by smooth pasting
conditions at the option exercise boundary. For ease of notation, we denote the unlevered value of
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the growth option by Gunlevi , i.e., G
unlev
i (X) = Gi
 
X
XunlevB ; XunlevR . Appendix A.2 states the
complete set of boundary conditions for the unlevered option value and presents the solution.
3.2. Firms with invested assets and expansion options
In this section, we derive the value of corporate securities of a general rm, as well as the default
and expansion thresholds selected by shareholders.
After exercise, a rm consists of only invested assets, endowed with the initially determined
optimal coupon level. The post-exercise value of corporate securities inuences their pre-exercise
value. As the default policy is an ex-post policy, the optimal default thresholds after exercise
correspond to the ones of a rm with only invested assets. That is, equityholders optimally adapt
their default policy upon expansion. Debtholders anticipate this change. Let d^i(X) denote the
value of corporate debt of a rm with only invested assets, and di(X) the value of debt of a rm
with invested assets and an expansion option in regime i = B;R. The solution for d^i (X) can be
found in Appendix A.3, the derivation being analogous to Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006).
The following proposition states the value of innite maturity debt of a rm with invested assets
and an expansion option.
Proposition 2. For any given set of default and exercise boundaries [DB; DR; XB; XR], the value
of innite maturity debt in regime i is given by
di (X) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
i
 
Xyi +G
unlev
i (X)

X  Di; i = B;R;
C1X
B1 + C2X
B2 + C5X
3 + C6X
4
+~B
RyR
rnB ~B+~B
X + c
rnB+
~B
DB < X  DR; i = B
Ai1X
1 +Ai2X
2 +Ai3X
3 +Ai4X
4 + c
rpi
DR < X  XB; i = B;R
B1X
R1 +B2X
R2 + Z (X) + ~R
c
rPi (rnR+~R)
+ c
rnR+
~R
XB < X  XR; i = R
d^i

sX   Kyi

X > Xi; i = B;R:
(22)
Gunlevi denotes the unlevered option value in regime i (see Proposition 1), and
i1;2 =
1
2
  ~i
~2i

vuut1
2
  ~i
~2i
2
+
2

rni +
~i

~2i
(23)
C5 = R
l3
l3
AunlevB3 (24)
C6 = R
l4
l4
AunlevB4 : (25)
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k; k = 1; 2; 3; 4 are the roots of the quartic equation
~R +
1
2
~2R(   1)  ~R   rnR

~B +
1
2
~2B(   1)  ~B   rnB

= ~R~B: (26)
ARk, k = 1; 2; 3; 4; is a multiple of ABk with the factor
lk :=
1
~B
(rnB +
~B   ~Bk   1
2
~2Bk(k   1)); (27)
and rpi is the perpetual risk-free rate given by
rpi = ri +
rj   ri
~p+ rj
~p ~fj ; (28)
in which ~p = ~1+~2 is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival, and

~fB; ~fR

=

R
~p ;
B
~p

the long-run
risk-neutral distribution. The function Z (X) is given by
Z (X) = ~R
X
i;k=1;2
2( 1)i+1skA^Bk
~2R
 
R2   R1
  
k   Ri
Xk2F1 k; Ri ; Ri   k + 1;  KsXyB

; (29)
in which 2F1 is Gauss' hyperbolic function. d^i () denotes the value of debt of a rm with only
invested assets. [AB1; AB2; AB3; AB4; C1; C2; B1; B2] solve a linear system given in Appendix A.4.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In each regime, the rm faces three dierent regions depending on the value of X: Below the
default threshold, i.e., X  Di; the rm is in the default region where it defaults immediately, and
debtholders receive a fraction i of the total asset value. The rm is in the continuation region
if X is between the default threshold and the exercise boundary, i.e., Di < X  Xi. Finally, the
exercise region is reached if X > Xi; i.e., X is above the exercise boundary.
In the continuation region, the value of corporate debt is determined by three components. The
rst component is the value of a risk-free claim to the perpetual stream of coupon. The second and
third components reect the changes in the value of debt that occur either due to the idiosyncratic
shock reaching a boundary, or due to a regime switch. Proposition 2 shows that for the region
DR < X  XB; i.e., when the rm is in the continuation region in both boom and recession,
the solution consists of ve terms. The value of the risk-free claim to the coupon is given by the
last term. The coupon is discounted by the perpetual risk-free rate rpi that takes into account
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the expected future time spent in each regime. The rst four terms capture the changes in value
due to the idiosyncratic shock X hitting a region boundary, or due to a change of regime. When
DB < X  DR, i.e., the rm is in the continuation region only in boom, the solution consists of six
terms. The last term is the value of the risk-free claim to the coupon. Here, the discount rate is
given by the nominal interest rate in boom, rnB, increased by
~B to reect the possibility of a regime
switch to recession. The rst ve terms capture the changes in debt value that occur when the
idiosyncratic shock reaches a boundary, or when the regime switches to recession. For the region
XB < X  XR, i.e., when the rm is in the continuation region only in recession, the solution
consists of ve terms. The last term is the value of a risk-free perpetual claim to the coupon. To
account for a possible regime switch to boom, the discount rate is here given by the interest rate in
recession, rnR, increased by
~R. The remaining four terms capture the value changes due to reaching
a region boundary, either XB from above or XR from below, or due to a regime switch to boom
triggering immediate option exercise.11
The following remark shows how to express the value of nite maturity debt, tax benets, and
bankruptcy costs using Proposition 2. Let ti (X) ; bi (X) denote the value of the tax shield and
bankruptcy costs of a rm with both assets in place and an expansion option in regime i = B;R,
respectively, and t^i (X) ; b^i (X) the corresponding value functions of a rm with only invested assets.
Remark 1. (i) The value of nite maturity debt with principal p and a fraction m of debt
continuously rolled over is given by (22) in Proposition 2, in which c and rni are replaced by
c +mp and rin +m; respectively, and d^i is replaced by the value of nite maturity debt of a
rm with only invested assets.
(ii) The value of the tax shield is given by (22) in Proposition 2, in which c and i are replaced
by c and 0, respectively, and d^i in the last line of (22) is replaced by t^.
(iii) The value of bankruptcy costs is given by (22) in Proposition 2, in which c and i are replaced
by 0 and 1  i, respectively, and d^i in the last line of (22) is replaced by b^.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
11Since the exercise of the option is nanced by selling assets in place, the debt value after exercise is not homoge-
neous in X. The function Z (X) captures this non-homogeneity after exercise, and can, therefore, not be simplied
to a nite sum.
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Next, the total rm value fi in regime i = B;R is given by the value of assets in place yiX,
plus the value of the expansion option Gi (X) and the value of tax benets from debt ti(X), less
the value of default costs bi(X), i.e.,
fi(X) = yiX +Gi(X) + ti(X)  bi(X): (30)
As the total rm value equals the sum of debt and equity values, the equity value ei(X);
i = B;R; can, hence, be written as
ei (X) = fi (X)  di (X) = yiX +Gi (X) + ti (X)  bi (X)  di (X) : (31)
Equityholders select the default and investment policies that maximize the value of equity ex-
post. Denote these policies by Di and X

i ; respectively. Formally, the default policy that maximizes
the equity value is determined by postulating that the rst derivative of the equity value has to
be zero at the default boundary in each regime. Simultaneously, optimality of the option exercise
boundaries is achieved by equating the rst derivative of the equity value at the exercise boundary
with the rst derivative of the equity value of a rm with only invested assets after expansion,
evaluated at the corresponding earnings in both regimes. These four optimality conditions are
smooth-pasting conditions for equity at the respective boundaries:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
e0B(D

B) = 0
e0R(D

R) = 0
e0B(X

B) = e^
0
B((s+ 1)X

B   KyB )
e0R(X

R) = e^
0
R((s+ 1)X

R   KyR ):
(32)
We solve this system numerically.
For each coupon level c, debtholders evaluate debt at issuance anticipating the ex-post optimal
default and expansion decisions of shareholders. As debt-issue proceeds accrue to shareholders, the
latter do not only care about the value of equity, but also about the value of debt. Hence, the
optimal capital structure is determined ex-ante by the coupon level c that maximizes the value of
equity and debt, i.e., the value of the rm. Denote by fi (X) the rm value given optimal ex-post
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default and expansion thresholds as determined by the System (32). The ex-ante optimal coupon
of this rm solves
ci := argmaxcf

i (X): (33)
As indicated in Eq. (33), the optimal initial capital structure depends on the current regime.
4. Results
This section summarizes the model results for individual rms. Section 4.1 presents the param-
eter choice. We describe the rm sample in Section 4.2. Next, Section 4.3 discusses the properties
of the expansion option. Section 4.4, nally, analyzes the optimal default policies of individual
rms with dierent portions of the expansion options' value in the overall value of assets.
4.1. Choice of parameters
Table 1 summarizes our parameter choice. Panel A shows the rm characteristics that are
selected to roughly reect a typical BBB-rated S&P 500 rm.12 We start with an initial value of
the idiosyncratic after-tax earnings X of 10. While this value is arbitrary, neither credit spreads
nor optimal leverage ratios depend on this choice. As is standard in the literature, we set the
tax advantage of debt to  = 0:15 (Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec, 2006). Bhamra, Kuehn and
Strebulaev (2010b) estimate growth rates and systematic volatilities of nominal earnings in a two
regime model. Their estimates are similar to those obtained by other authors who jointly estimate
consumption and dividends with a state-dependent drift and volatility (e.g., Bonomo and Garcia,
1996). Hence, the real earnings growth rates (i;real) and volatilities (
X;C
i;real) are chosen such that
the nominal growth rates and systematic volatilities correspond to their empirical counterparts.
Note that the relation X;CB = 0:0834 < 0:1334 = 
X;C
R captures the observation in Ang and
Bekaert (2004) that asset volatilities are lower in boom than in recession.
Following Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), we assume that recovery rates fall during
recession. They report that recovery in a distressed state of the industry is lower than the recovery
12Our qualitative results do not depend on the ratings of rms.
20
in a healthy state of the industry by up to 20 cents on a dollar. The reason can be nancial
constraints that industry peers of defaulted rms face as proposed by the re-sales or the industry-
equilibrium theory of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), or time-varying market frictions such as adverse
selection. We choose recovery rates as B = 0:7 and R = 0:5, respectively, which matches the 20
cents on a dollar dierence in Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), and is close to the standard
of 0:6 used in the literature (Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec, 2006; Chen, 2010). Our qualitative
results are insensitive to the choice of i as long as B > R.
Panel B shows the parameters we use to capture growth options. We select an exercise price
of K = 310. The choice of a relatively high K is motivated by our intention to investigate rms
that do not exercise their expansion option immediately. The scale parameter s for a typical rm
is calibrated such that the asset composition ratio at initiation given optimal nancing equals the
average Tobin's Q of 1:6 in our sample of BBB-rated rms. In particular, s is set to s = 1:89 for
rms initiated in boom, and to s = 2:05 for rms initiated in recession. To analyze growth rms
with a larger (smaller) portion of option values in the overall value of their assets, we will later use
higher (lower) scale parameters at initiation.
Panel C, nally, lists the variables describing the underlying economy. The rate of leaving
regime i (i), the consumption growth rates (i), and the consumption growth volatilities 
C
i are
estimated in Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b). We take the same values for comparability. In
the described economy, the expected duration of regime B (R) is 3:68 (2:03) years, and the average
fraction of time spent in regime B (R) is 64% (36%). The ination parameters are estimated using
the price index for personal consumption expenditures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
from 1947 to 2005. We obtain an expected ination rate () of 0:0342, a volatility of the price
index of 0:0137, and a correlation between the price index and real non-durables plus service
consumption expenditures of  0:2575. These parameters imply a systematic price index volatility
of P;C =  0:0035 and an idiosyncratic price index volatility of P;id = 0:0132.
The annualized rate of time preference, , is 0:015, the relative risk aversion, , is equal to 10
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 	, is set to 1:5. This parameter choice is commonly
used in the literature (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Chen, 2010).
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Our choice of parameters implies that real interest rates are rB = 0:0416 and rR = 0:0227 in
the baseline specication. The relative decline in the value of invested assets following a shift from
boom to recession is equal to 12:61%, which is similar to the one assumed in Hackbarth, Miao and
Morellec (2006).
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
4.2. Firm sample
Balance sheet and ratings data are collected over the period from 1995 to 2008 from Compustat.
We use data for BBB-rated rms. We calculate the quasi-market leverage of a rm as the ratio
of book debt to the sum of book debt and market value of equity. Tobin's Q is dened as total
assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets.13 We
delete nancial and utility rms from the sample. For each rm, we calculate the average of the
leverage ratios and Tobin's Qs over the observation period. Next, we cut extreme values of both
average leverage and Tobin's Q at 1% to avoid that our results are driven by outliers. Our sample
then consists of 717 distinct rms. Fig. 1 plots the resulting data points. For the entire sample of
BBB-rated rms, the mean leverage is 41:83%, and the mean Tobin's Q (asset composition ratio)
is 1:59.
INSERT FIG. 1 HERE
4.3. Properties of the expansion option
To understand the implications of our model for credit spreads, it is instructive to rst consider
some properties of the expansion option.
13In these denitions, we follow, e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002), Fama and French (2002) and Daines, Gow and
Larcker (2010). Book debt is total assets (item 6, AT ) minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total
liabilities (item 181, LT ) minus preferred stock (item 10, PSTKL, replaced by item 56 when missing, PSTKRV )
plus deferred taxes (item 35, TXDITC) plus convertible debt (item 79, DCV T ). The market value of equity is given
by the closing price (item 24, PRCC F ) times the number of common shares outstanding (item 25, CSHO).
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Fig. 2 depicts the equity value maximizing exercise policy of the expansion option in a typical
rm initiated in boom. Recall that the expansion policy is simultaneously determined with the
default policy.
INSERT FIG. 2 HERE
The area above the dashed line is the exercise region in recession, and the area below the
dashed line corresponds to the continuation region. In boom, the regions are dened analogously
with respect to the solid line. The graph is drawn for optimal leverage. Exercising the option at
time t entitles the rm to total future after-tax earnings of (s + 1)Xt for all t  t. As expected,
the endogenous exercise boundaries decrease with s. For example, consider initiation in boom:
With a scale parameter of s = 1:89 (that induces an asset composition ratio of 1:6 at initiation),
the corresponding optimal option exercise boundaries are XB = 18:26 and X

R = 19:55. Setting s
to 2:73 creates a growth rm with an asset composition ratio of 2:2, and optimal option exercise
boundaries of XB = 12:88 and X

R = 13:90, respectively. Importantly, Fig. 2 also shows that
the expansion option is exercised at lower levels of the idiosyncratic earnings X in boom than in
recession. Intuitively, the main reason is that the value of the option of waiting is higher in recession
due to the potential switch to boom with a higher valuation of earnings.14 The same qualitative
option value properties also hold at non-optimal leverage levels.
Fig. 3 plots the value of the expansion option as a function of the after-tax earnings X, using
jointly optimal expansion and default policies.
INSERT FIG. 3 HERE
Obviously, the option's value is aected by the current regime. When the asset value jumps due
to a regime switch, so does the value of the option. Critically, relative value changes of expansion
options are higher than relative value changes of assets in place when the regime switches. The
14The regime dependent volatilities and default thresholds also aect optimal exercise boundaries in boom and
recession. We nd that the valuation of earnings is the dominating eect for reasonable parameter values.
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reasons are that options represent levered claims, and that the endogenous exercise boundary is
higher in recession than in boom, as shown in Fig. 2.15
Additionally, Fig. 3 shows that both option value functions are convex, but the value function in
boom is steeper than the one in recession. Therefore, the expansion option's value is less sensitive to
the underlying earnings in recession than in boom. Intuitively, the exercise boundary increases and
the earnings' drift decreases in recession, which drives options out-of-the money. As a consequence,
an expansion option represents a less levered claim in bad times. While in recession the volatility
of X is higher, the sensitivity of a growth option's value to changes in the earnings is lower. As
discussed in the next section, this lower sensitivity attenuates the increase in the equityholder's
default option due to a higher volatility of X during recession.
4.4. Optimal default policy
This section explains how the optimal default policy is aected by the presence of growth options
in the value of rms' assets. To keep the intuition tractable, we do not comment on the (minor)
impact of the exercise boundaries on default thresholds, which arises due to the simultaneous
optimization of the expansion and default policy.
For all rms { those with and those without an expansion option { the optimal default policy
is determined by recognizing that, at any point, shareholders can either make coupon payments
and retain their claim together with the option to default, or forfeit the rm in exchange for the
waiver of debt obligations. When the economy shifts from boom to recession, the present value
of future after-tax earnings declines mainly because rm earnings have a lower drift, and because
they become both more volatile and more correlated with the market. This present value decline
reduces the continuation value (the expected value from keeping the rm alive) for equityholders,
inducing them to default earlier (at higher earnings levels) in recession. We refer to this eect as
the value eect. On the other hand, a high earnings volatility in recession makes the option to
default more valuable, which defers default in bad times. This is the volatility eect. As in the
15Relative value changes are determined in Appendix A.2. In untabulated results, we conrm numerically that the
relative value changes are indeed higher for expansion options than for the underlying assets in place for plausible
parameter values.
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models for invested assets of Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b) and Chen (2010), the value
eect usually dominates the volatility eect, generating higher default thresholds in recession, i.e.,
leading to counter-cyclical default thresholds. Counter-cyclical default thresholds together with a
high volatility in bad times imply counter-cyclical default probabilities, consistent with empirical
evidence (Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). Additionally, default losses are
empirically reported to be higher in recession because many rms experience poor performances
during such times. Combined with higher marginal utilities in bad times, these mechanisms raise
the present value of expected default losses for bondholders which leads to higher credit spreads
and lower optimal leverage ratios than in standard contingent claim models.
Fig. 4 draws the equity value maximizing default policy of levered rms initiated in boom. The
graph shows default thresholds for a range of asset composition ratios. Leverage is held constant
at 41:83%.16 The solid line shows the default threshold in boom, and the dashed line the one in
recession. For example, for a rm with only invested assets the optimal default thresholds are
DB = 2:45 and D

R = 2:69. For an average rm with an asset composition ratio of 1:6 they are
DB = 3:19 and D

R = 3:55, and for a growth rm with an asset composition ratio of 2:2 they are
DB = 3:52 and D

R = 3:94. In the no-default region above the line corresponding to a given regime,
the continuation value for equityholders exceeds the default value and it is optimal for shareholders
to keep injecting funds into the rm.
INSERT FIG. 4 HERE
Two points from Fig. 4 are particularly noteworthy. First, the optimal default thresholds
increase as the asset composition ratio increases, inducing a higher default probability. This nding
evolves from the observation that growth options represent levered claims, which are relatively
more sensitive than invested assets to a given decrease in X. Second, while all rms are more
likely to default in recession than in boom, the increasing distance between DB and D

R for larger
asset composition ratios indicates that the counter-cyclicality of default boundaries is particularly
16When the scale parameter is changed but the coupon is left constant, default thresholds are not directly compa-
rable. The reason is that the total asset value increases with s for every X. Considering constant leverage assures
that the considered coupon changes consistently with the increase in the total asset value when we alter s.
25
pronounced for growth rms. The reason is that due to the higher relative value change of growth
options upon a regime switch, the value eect is stronger for a rm with a high asset composition
ratio. Additionally, because options represent less levered claims in recession than in boom, the
increase in the equityholders' default option - due to the higher volatility of X when the regime
switches to recession - is attenuated for growth rms. In other words, the volatility eect, which
tends to decrease the distance between the default thresholds, is weaker for rms with larger
expansion options.
5. Aggregate dynamics of leverage, asset composition, investment and defaults
To validate our structural equilibrium framework with intertemporal macroeconomic risk and
investment, we analyze the dynamic properties of our model-implied economy. In this section,
we qualitatively compare the aggregate predictions for the entire economy to empirically reported
capital structure, investment, and default patterns.
5.1. Simulation
We generate a dynamic economy of average rms implied by our model. We consider 1,000
identical rms with innite debt maturity. Initially, each rm's after-tax earnings are X = 10,
and the option scale parameter is assumed to be s = 1:89 if the rm's initial regime is boom, and
s = 2:05 otherwise. These choices of s imply an asset composition ratio of 1:6 in both states at
initiation, given optimal leverage. Firms receive the same macroeconomic and ination shocks,
but experience dierent idiosyncratic shocks. Each rm observes its current earnings as well as
the current regime on a monthly basis and behaves optimally: If the current earnings are below
the corresponding regime-dependent default threshold, the rm defaults immediately; if the current
earnings are above the corresponding regime-depending option exercise boundary, the rm exercises
its expansion option; otherwise, the rm takes no action.
In our model, rms have a growth option, which can only be exercised once. To maintain a
balanced sample of rms, and to avoid that the average asset composition ratio is systematically
trending towards the one of a rm with only invested assets when we simulate the economy over
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time, we exogenously introduce new rms. In particular, we substitute each defaulted or exercised
rm by a new rm whose growth option is still intact. New rms have initial after-tax earnings of
X = 10, and an option scale parameter s according to the current regime as described above.
To ensure convergence to the long-run steady state, we rst simulate the economy for 100 years.
The starting period for the reported results is the nal period of the rst 100 years of simulation.
Next, we simulate the model for 200 years and present the aggregate dynamics.
5.2. Results
We start by discussing the cyclicality of leverage. Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) generate
counter-cyclical optimal leverage ratios in their macroeconomic model. As in our framework, the
optimal coupon rate of debt initiated in boom exceeds the one in recession. At the same time, the
value of assets is greater in boom. The second eect dominates the rst, generating the counter-
cyclicality in optimal leverage. We additionally incorporate the empirical fact that asset volatility
is regime-dependent. Because the latter decreases in boom and increases in recession, our optimal
coupon rate varies more than in Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) when the regime changes.
With this extension, the change in the value of optimal debt dominates the change in the value
of assets, generating pro-cyclical optimal leverage ratios for realistic parameter values, in line with
Covas and Den Haan (2006) and Korteweg (2010). Fig. 5 plots the simulated market leverage in
the economy. Shaded areas represent recessions. Even though our optimal initial leverage ratios
are pro-cyclical, the simulated time series shows that actual aggregated market leverage is counter-
cyclical. The reason is that when rms are stuck with the debt issued at initiation, the equity
value declines more than the debt value during recessions, which tends to increase leverage in bad
times. This prediction conforms to Korajczyk and Levy (2003) who show that unconstrained rms'
leverage ratios vary counter-cyclically.
INSERT FIG. 5 HERE
Fig. 6 shows the time series of the aggregate asset composition ratio in the simulated economy.
As expansion options are more sensitive to the underlying stochastic processes than invested assets,
the ratio behaves pro-cyclically, as reported in the literature.
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We investigate aggregate default rates in Fig. 7. Simulated default rates are counter-cyclical,
consistent with the empirical fact that most defaults occur during economic recessions. Additionally,
the graph shows several spikes in default rates that occur right at the time when the economy enters
into a recession, consistent with the empirical evidence in Due, Saita and Wang (2007) and Das,
Due, Kapadia and Saita (2007) (see, e.g., around years 50 and 90). Recall that defaults can occur
because either the idiosyncratic earnings reach the default threshold in a given regime, or due to
a change of the macroeconomic regime from boom to recession. The clustered default waves occur
due to an increase in rms' default thresholds upon such a regime change. All rms between the
two thresholds default simultaneously when the regime switches to recession, even though their
earnings do not exhibit instantaneous regime-induced changes. After such waves of default, the
default frequency tends to remain high during recessions.
As a renement of this general result, we expect that the tendency to default during recession
should be particularly pronounced for rms with high expansion options. This prediction is sug-
gested by the fact that the degree of counter-cyclicality of default thresholds is positively related to
the initial asset composition ratio. We investigate the propensity to default during recession in a
dynamic, simulation-based setting by counting default rates of two separate aggregate economies.
The rst one is designed as above, consisting of rms with both assets in place and growth op-
tions, such that the asset composition ratio at initiation is 1.6. The second setting consists of
rms with only invested assets. To construct a number of cross-sectional distributions of rms, we
rst simulate 20 dynamic economies for ten years. Using each economy obtained at the end of the
rst ten years, the default rates in both regimes are observed for 50 subsequent simulations of the
following 20 years, resulting in a total of 1,000 simulations. The average percentage of defaults
that occurs during recession is then calculated.17 We nd that in the rst economy, on average,
75:41%, 76:79%, and 77:66% of total defaults of rms with assets in place and growth opportunities
17The distance to default in the aggregate economy of rms with only invested assets is trending over time. The
reason is that rms that default are replaced, but there are no option exercises after which well performing rms
could be replaced. Consequently, we do not compare absolute default rates of the two economies, but rather the
fraction of defaults occurring in each regime.
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occur during recession over ve, ten, and 20 years, respectively. In the economy in which rms only
have invested assets, the corresponding numbers are considerably smaller at 66:40%, 71:66%, and
73:71%, respectively.
This nding is also related to the observation that, on average, growth rms have lower recovery
rates than value rms (Cantor and Varma, 2005). The standard argument oered by Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) is that growth rms as potential buyers of growth assets have little cash relative to
the value of assets. Hence, they are likely to be themselves credit constrained when other growth
rms sell their assets upon default, which lowers recovery rates. Our model delivers an alternative
explanation: We show that growth options in the value of rms' assets create a propensity to
default during recession, when recovery rates are low.
INSERT FIG. 7 HERE
A signicant literature suggests that business cycle shocks common to all rms play a crucial
role in explaining aggregate investment. In particular, there is evidence that aggregate investment
is characterized by both episodes of very intense investment activity and periods of very low in-
vestment activity (Doms and Dunne, 1998; Oivind and Schiantarelli, 2003). Moreover, aggregate
investment and the probability of investment spikes are strongly pro-cyclical (Barro, 1990; Cooper,
Haltiwanger and Power, 1999). Our model reects these features. First, when the regime switches
from recession to boom, rms in the region between the two investment boundaries exercise their
expansion option simultaneously by investing K. Fig. 8 shows that investment spikes often occur
upon such regime switches (see for example around year 35, or year 60). After these spikes, simu-
lated investment rates tend to remain high during boom due to the positive drift of the earnings.
Hence, we observe pro-cyclical investment spikes followed by higher investment activity during
booms. At the other end, investment activity often dries out when the economy switches from
boom to recession, because the optimal exercise boundary jumps up and the expected earnings'
drift turns negative. Our model also predicts that observed investment waves should be mainly
driven by rms with high expansion options.
INSERT FIG. 8 HERE
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Finally, we plot simulated average credit spreads in Fig. 9. Credit spreads are calculated as
(c=di(X))   rpi , in which rpi is the perpetual risk-free rate dened in (28). Consistent with the
empirical literature (Fama and French, 1989), we nd counter-cyclical credit spreads. When the
economy stays in boom, credit spreads tend to decline as distances to default increase due to the
positive expected drift of the earnings and the lower default threshold. Conversely, in recession,
credit spreads rise as distances to default tend to decline and the volatility increases.
INSERT FIG. 9 HERE
6. Quantitative implications and empirical predictions
In this section, we discuss the quantitative implications and empirical predictions of our model.
The attention is restricted to BBB-rated rms since it has been argued that the pricing of very high-
grade investment rms is dominated by factors other than credit risk such as liquidity risk or a tax
component (Longsta, Mithal and Neis, 2005; De Jong and Joost, 2006). We start by determining
target observed average credit spreads. Duee (1998) estimates an average yield spread in the
industrial sector between BBB-rated bonds and Treasury yields of 198, 148, and 149 bps for bonds
with a mean maturity of 21 years (long), 8:9 years (medium), and 4:7 years (short), respectively.
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) report somewhat lower spreads of 143 bps for bonds with 15 30
years (long), 115 bps for 7 15 years (medium), and 115 bps for 1 7 years maturity, respectively.18
From these spreads, we subtract 35:5% to reect the results in Longsta, Mithal and Neis (2005)
and Han and Zhou (2011) who nd non-default components in BBB bond yields of 29% and 42%,
respectively. We arrive at a plausible target range of around 92 to 128 bps for long maturities,
74 to 95 bps for medium maturities, and 74 to 96 bps for short maturities.19 Panel A in Table 2
tabulates these target credit spread ranges. In Panel B, we also report empirical default rates of
BBB-rated debt over ve, ten, and 20 years from Moody's (2010).
18The estimates of short and medium maturities in Huang and Huang (2003) are higher because of the embedded
call options in the corporate bond sample and the inclusion of two recessions with high spreads.
19We recalculate target ranges by subtracting the absolute non-default component for BBB rms of 61:8 bps
reported in Han and Zhou (2011), or by subtracting the 29% reported in Longsta, Mithal and Neis (2005) for an
earlier sample period. Our model's performance does not depend on the exact denition of targets.
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We discuss the implications of our model for credit spreads and leverage along two dimensions.
First, we follow the traditional way of investigating a typical individual rm. Second, we implement
an approach similar to the one proposed by Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b) in which credit
spreads and leverage ratios are calculated as cross-sectional averages based on a simulation of the
empirical distribution of BBB-rated individual rms.
6.1. Credit spreads
6.1.1. Typical rm with endogenous default boundary
Credit spreads for various models on newly issued corporate debt are calculated in Table 3
for ve (short), ten (medium), and 20 (long) years maturity.20 We follow the standard approach
in structural models by calibrating the idiosyncratic earnings volatility such that the total asset
volatility is approximately 25% in each model, the average asset volatility of rms with outstanding
rated corporate debt (Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008). Additionally, we x leverage at the average
ratio of 41:83% in our BBB-rm sample.
Importantly, the default boundaries and expansion thresholds are assumed to be chosen op-
timally by equityholders, as we are interested in whether our model can generate both realistic
prices of corporate claims and realistic endogenous default and expansion rates. Specifying default
boundaries exogenously such that a model's actual default probabilities match the data (as done
in Chen, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2009) or Huang and Huang (2003)) not only substantially
dilutes the value of the option to default, but also distorts the value of the expansion option because
the latter depends on the default policy.
It is well-known that structural models of default typically generate credit spreads that are too
low compared to their empirical counterpart. To illustrate this point, we rst analyze the model
without business cycle risk in Panel A of Table 3. The expected drifts and systematic volatilities
of earnings and consumption are set equal to their unconditional means. Panel A shows credit
20The value of a nite maturity risk-free bond is given in Appendix A.4, Formula (A-74), in which c is replaced by
c+mp and rni is replaced by r
n
i +m.
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spreads for dierent maturities of the standard structural model of Leland (1998). The empirical
target credit spreads in Table 2 are about ve times larger for the short maturity, and about three
times larger for the medium and long term than those predicted by the structural model.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b) and Chen (2010) derive structural multi-regime models
for typical rms that consist of only invested assets. We closely replicate their approach for an
average rm within a two-regime model. To match the asset volatility of 25%, the idiosyncratic
earnings volatility is set to X;id = 0:21. Panel B reports unconditional credit spreads, calculated
as a weighted average of the state-dependent credit spreads, in which the weights correspond to
the long-run distribution of the Markov chain. For comparability to our setting with expansion
options, the results without debt restructuring are presented. While the credit spreads for typical
rms of 35, 56, and 78 bps for ve, ten, and 20 years maturity, respectively, are clearly higher than
in the one regime model, they are still considerably below their targets.21
Next, we investigate our model with expansion options for a typical BBB-rated rm. Note
that for a given idiosyncratic earnings volatility, rms with dierent asset composition ratios have
dierent total asset volatilities due the inherent leverage of their expansion option. Moreover, a
rm's asset volatility is not constant over time, as its option's moneyness changes when X moves
towards or away from the exercise boundary. To obtain the average volatility for a certain rating
class, the standard approach in the literature is to average the calculated asset volatilities over all
rms with the same rating (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Duan, 1994; Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008).
We calibrate the idiosyncratic volatility X;id to the empirically reported average asset volatility
of 0:25: Given an idiosyncratic volatility X;id, we simulate model-implied samples of BBB-rated
rms over ten years, and calculate the resulting average asset volatility. (Details on the simulation
can be found in Appendix A.5.1.) The calibration yields X;id = 0:168; which ensures that the
21Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b) use higher recovery rates, lower leverage and do not model the impact
of principal repayments on default thresholds, which results in marginally lower credit spreads in their static case.
Chen (2010) obtains larger ten year credit spreads in a model with nine states and a dynamic capital structure, but
uses higher leverage, and a cash ow volatility that induces a much higher asset volatility than empirically observed.
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average asset volatility of our simulated BBB-rated rms with expansion options corresponds to
its empirical counterpart.22
Panel C of Table 3 shows the resulting credit spreads for typical rms. Several aspects are
noteworthy about these results. Our model increases the unconditional credit spreads of an average
rm for ve, ten, and 20 years from 18 bps to 45 bps (+150%), from 29 bps to 66 bps (+128%),
and from 41 bps to 84 bps (+105%), respectively, compared to the one regime model in Panel
A. To understand this large eect, recall rst that macroeconomic models generate larger credit
spreads than one regime models because recessions are times of high marginal utility, so that default
losses that occur during these times will aect investors more. An important economic implication
is that the average duration of bad times in the risk-neutral world is longer than in the actual
world. Since the representative agent uses risk-neutral and not actual probabilities to account for
risk and to compute prices, credit spreads are larger and the agent behaves more conservatively
than historical default losses imply. Second, if rms have a higher tendency to default in recession,
this discrepancy will increase due to the higher risk premium. Our model shows that because
of the strong sensitivity of option values to regime switches, and because they are less sensitive
to the underlying earnings during recession, the counter-cyclicality of default thresholds is more
pronounced for rms with larger growth options. The resulting stronger counter-cyclicality of the
default probability of growth rms thus drives up their credit spreads. As can be seen in row 2
of Panel C, the credit spreads for an average rm, consisting of both invested assets and growth
options, are 45 bps, 66 bps, and 84 bps for debt maturities of ve, ten, and 20 years, respectively.
This is, respectively, 29%, 18%, and 8% higher than the credit spreads of an average rm in the
standard macroeconomic model with only invested assets.23
22We also repeat this exercise with dierent specications, such as alternative simulation length and debt maturity.
The resulting idiosyncratic volatilities are fairly insensitive to these variations. An alternative approach is to calibrate
the idiosyncratic volatility to the cumulative default probability of BBB-rated rms (Chen, 2010). This procedure,
however, usually leads to asset volatilities that are higher than the ones empirically observed.
23We cannot directly compare the results for invested assets in Panel C to the ones for average rms in Panel B,
even though the latter consist of only invested assets. The reason is that in our model, the idiosyncratic volatility is
calibrated such that the asset volatility of the entire sample of BBB-rated rms matches 0:25, whereas in Panel B,
X;id is chosen such that rms with only invested assets have an asset volatility of 0:25.
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Besides the fact that they generate too low credit spreads, another problem of existing struc-
tural models is that the implied term structure of credit spreads at initiation is much steeper than
its empirical counterpart for a typical rm. The reason is that the implied spreads are particularly
low at the short end. Most existing studies with macroeconomic models use the default thresholds
of innite maturity debt (that is, debt without principal repayments) to numerically calculate the
risk-neutral default probability for each maturity. As the credit risk literature identies rms' debt
maturity as an important determinant of credit risk (Gopalan, Song and Yerramilli, 2010; He and
Xiong, 2011), we endogenously derive optimal default thresholds also for nite debt maturity fol-
lowing the approach of Leland (1998). Due to the continuous principal repayments, these thresholds
are considerably higher for short maturities than for innite debt, resulting in larger credit spreads
at the short end. The resulting term structure of credit spreads for an average rm in Panel A, B,
and C is consequently atter and, hence, closer to the shape observed in target spreads than when
using default thresholds of innite maturity debt.24
The rows in Panel C of Table 3 identify the cross-sectional relationship between the asset
composition ratio and credit risk. To tease out the eect of growth options on credit spreads, we
vary the asset composition ratio by altering s. As raising s increases the value of the expansion
option, we simultaneously adapt the coupon to maintain a constant leverage of 41:83%.25 This
exercise shows that the asset base of the rm is an important driver of credit risk, implying a
positive relationship between the portion of growth options in the value of a rm's assets and the
costs of debt. In particular, altering the asset composition ratio of a rm from 1 to 2:2 increases
credit spreads by about 56% to 96%, depending on the debt maturity. This eect is remarkable
given that we solely vary the assets' characteristics. It arises for two reasons in our model. First,
because options are levered, and due to the endogenous investment boundary, expansion options are
24We use default boundaries for the appropriate debt maturities in both Panels B and C to highlight the pure eect
of expansion options on credit spreads.
25Alternatively, changing both s and K to alter the asset composition qualitatively retains the aggregate and
cross-sectional predictions. Holding s constant while only varying K implies large decreases in the option exercise
boundaries for relatively small increases of the asset composition ratio. In the extreme, a rm with a very low K will
exercise its expansion option almost immediately; in essence, credit spreads then virtually mirror those of a rm with
only invested assets, diluting the model's cross-sectional predictions. Note also that any variation in K changes the
costs of investment. By only varying s, we instead avoid that our results are driven by dierent sizes of the expected
nancing in case of equity-nanced investment costs.
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more sensitive to the underlying uncertainty, and, hence, more volatile. This higher volatility drives
up the default probability of growth rms. Second, a higher portion of the expansion option's value
in the overall asset value of a rm induces a higher counter-cyclicality of the default probability,
which raises expected default costs. The higher default probability and larger default costs both
increase the costs of debt for growth rms.
Note that while rms with growth options generally have a higher credit spread than rms with
only invested assets (ceteris paribus), credit risk is concave in the asset composition ratio. This
concavity occurs because rms with a larger asset composition ratio are closer to their exercise
boundary, where credit spreads also reect that the asset volatility and the counter-cyclicality of
the default thresholds will decrease when a rm exercises its expansion option.
Our model rationalizes empirical properties of the cross-section of credit risk. For example,
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) nd that market-to-book asset values, the ratio of research and
development expenses to total investment expenditure, and one minus the ratio of net property,
plant, and equipment to total assets are all signicantly and positively related to credit spreads
(Table VI on p. 2652). Similarly, Molina (2005) shows that rms with a higher ratio of xed assets
to total assets have lower bond yield spreads and higher ratings (Table II on p. 1438). This evidence
implies that, empirically, even after controlling for most factors relevant to credit risk in standard
structural models, credit spreads are higher for growth rms. Hence, while an average rm with
valuable growth options exhibits, for example, a dierent tax advantage of debt or payout ratio than
a rm that only consists of invested assets, simple variation of such input parameters would not
explain these ndings. What is needed to address the aggregate puzzle and the mentioned cross-
sectional evidence is a model that generates higher explained credit risk than standard models for
a given level of input parameters. Our model delivers this result.
6.1.2. True cross-section
The previous section calculates credit spreads of a typical individual rm, which is consistent
with the historically observed average input parameters of rms in the same rating class of which
the individual rm is representative.
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In this section, inspired by the work of Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b), we employ a
simulation approach to capture the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution of rm character-
istics. The central insight of our approach is that BBB-rated rms are very dierent with respect
to both leverage and asset composition ratios, and that credit spreads and default rates are highly
non-linear in these characteristics. Moreover, the previous section considers credit spreads solely
at debt issuance points, when the principal corresponds to the market value of debt. The majority
of empirically reported spreads are, however, based on observations made at times when debt is
not being issued. To capture the impact of these issues, it is important to calculate credit spreads
and default rates for a simulated sample of rms that matches the observed empirical distribution,
i.e., the true observed cross-section of BBB-rated companies. The resulting average of simulated
credit spreads can then be compared to the empirical average credit spread. Simultaneously, the
approach allows us to verify whether the default probabilities implied by our model correspond to
the reported historical default probabilities of BBB-rated rms.
To obtain the implications of the true cross-section of BBB-rated rms, we start by generating
a distribution of rms implied by the model. In particular, we set up a grid of optimally leveraged
rms with scale parameters s ranging from zero up to the largest possible value such that the option
is not exercised immediately. The step size is 0:05, and 50 identical rms are considered for each
value of the option scale parameter. Earnings paths of all rms are then simulated forward over ten
years, resulting in a model-implied economy populated by more than 3; 000 rms. This economy
has a broad range of leverage ratios and asset composition ratios.
In a second step, we match our historical distribution of BBB-rated rms with its model-
implied counterpart. For each observation in the average empirical cross-section, we select the rm
in our model-implied economy with the minimum distance regarding the percentage deviation from
the target average market leverage and asset composition ratio. The matching is generally very
accurate. Considering a debt maturity of ten years yields an average Euclidean distance of 0:0648,
with the 85%-quantile being 0:0865.26 That is, on average, only 15% of the rms are matched
26Other debt maturities yield virtually identical results for the matching accuracy.
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with the root of the sum of the squared percentage deviations being larger than 8:65%.27 Note
that while our initial model-implied economy potentially contains rms with dierent ratings, the
described matching procedure allows us to construct a cross-sectional distribution of model-implied
rms that closely reects its empirical BBB-rated counterpart.
Next, earnings paths of the 717 matched BBB-model-rms are simulated forward for 20 years
on a monthly basis. This simulation is repeated 50 times.
The outcome of both the matching and the forward simulation of the matched sample also
depends on the particular realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks and the states of the economy in
the rst simulation step. Hence, to explore the distributional properties of our results, the entire
procedure is conducted 20 times, which results in a total of 1; 000 simulations. Details on the
simulation are given in Appendix A.5.2.
Panel D of Table 3 summarizes the results. The average credit spreads, calculated during ve
years after the matching, are 57 bps for ve years, 81 bps for ten years, and 100 bps for 20 years.28
Hence, our model closely matches the historical levels reported in Table 2 for ten and 20 years.
Five year credit spreads are somewhat lower than their target. We also measure the cyclicality of
credit spreads. Average ten year credit spreads, for example, are 59 basis points during boom, and
115 during recession. As expected, they are strongly counter-cyclical.
Importantly, average credit spreads for the simulated true cross-section are considerably higher
than the ones of a typical rm at initiation. There are two reasons for this result. First, some
rms will be near default, and credit spreads are convex in the distance to default. Second, the
market value of debt corresponds to the principal at initiation. In practice, however, rms are not
at initiation most of the time. The actual market value of debt will, therefore, often underestimate
27The market leverage is matched with an average distance of 0:0248. The average percentage distance of the asset
composition ratio of 0:0549 is larger. This number is driven by a few rms with unusually high asset composition
ratios. As they would optimally exercise their expansion option immediately in our model, these rms are matched
with model rms with a somewhat lower asset composition ratio. We expect a minor impact of this limitation on our
results, because rms with unusually high asset composition ratios also have very low leverages, and, hence, are not
driving our average credit spreads.
28We follow Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b) in measuring average credit spreads over a ve year period.
During longer periods, many rms could deviate substantially from the initial average distribution, and would,
therefore, not be BBB-rated anymore.
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the burden from the principal repayments, and especially so for rms approaching their default
boundary. The reason is that the market value can hardly go beyond the principal as it is bounded
above by the value of risk-free debt, but can easily reach values below the principal when earnings
deteriorate. Our simulation of the true cross-section captures these asymmetric deviations over
time, resulting in higher average credit spreads than those of rms observed at initiation. Compared
to Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b), the additional credit spreads generated from simulating
the true cross-section are lower, because we do not incorporate debt restructuring.
To verify whether our model generates default rates corresponding to the empirically reported
default frequencies for realistic debt maturities, we also count cumulative default rates in the
simulated true cross-section. The model-implied average and median cumulative default rates over
several years are reported in each Panel of Table 4. Panel A presents default rates over ve, ten, and
20 years from simulations with rms issuing innite maturity debt. Panels B, C, and D show default
rates from simulations with rms issuing nite maturity debt. Due to the principal repayments,
default thresholds of rms with nite maturity debt are considerably higher than those of rms with
innite maturity debt. Note that simulated credit spreads are consistent with a range of realized
ex-post default rates, as observed default rates vary depending on a particular realization of good
and bad states. Therefore, we also report the 25% and 75% percentiles of the distribution.
Empirically, Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (2000) report a mean maturity of IPO bonds of
12 years, Guedes and Opler (1996) obtain an average maturity of 12:2 years for seasoned debt
oers, and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) measure a mean time to maturity of BBB-bonds in
the industrial sector of 9:51 years. Panel C of Table 4 shows that when assuming that rms have
a debt maturity of ten years, our model-implied median default rates over ve, ten, and 20 years
are very close to the historical default probabilities observed from 1920 to 2009 reported in Table
2. Hence, for a realistic debt maturity, our median economy is consistent with historical default
frequencies of BBB-rated rms. The average default rates are somewhat larger than their targets
due to a few realizations with long sojourn times in recession, resulting in high default rates.29
29The standard deviation of the sojourn times generated by Markov chains is quite large. In our model, long
sojourn times in recession cause high default rates for some sample paths. As default rates are non-linear in the
distance to default, long sojourn times in boom do not counterbalance the high rates in recession.
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Panels A and D show that while the generated rates tend to be too low in Panel A, but too large
in Panel D, historical default frequencies still fall within the 25% to 75% range of model-implied
median default rates for most years.
The large dierence between Panel A and D in both average and median default rates illustrates
that debt maturities and the associated default thresholds have an important eect on model-
implied default rates. It is, therefore, important to incorporate a realistic debt maturity when
calibrating models with endogenous default thresholds.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
In sum, our results demonstrate that the average credit spreads implied by our model for the
true cross-section are simultaneously consistent with historically observed average asset volatilities,
and, especially for typical debt maturities, with default rates reported for BBB-rated rms.
6.2. Leverage
This section analyzes the features of leverage ratios resulting from our model. We rst inves-
tigate how growth options aect the initial choice of optimal leverage in our model. At initiation,
a rm consisting of only invested assets has an optimal leverage that is between four and ve per-
centage points higher than the one of a typical rm with an asset composition ratio of 1:6 for all
debt maturities.30 The reason is that a higher asset composition ratio increases the default prob-
ability, particularly so in recessions in which default losses are larger and harder to bear. Due to
the resulting higher costs of debt, rms with growth options optimally select lower initial leverage.
As argued by Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010a), however, it can be misleading to make
quantitative statements simply based on optimal leverage at issue. Hence, we investigate the
leverage ratios of our true cross-section of BBB-rated rms simulated over ve years after matching.
For the main analysis, the debt maturity is assumed to be ten years.
30The dierence depends on the initial regime and the debt maturity. For example, with innite debt maturity, the
dierence in optimal initial leverage between a rm with only invested assets and a rm with an asset composition
ratio of 1:6 is 4% if the rms are initiated in boom. (The optimal leverage ratios in this case are 45:4% and 41:4%,
respectively.) For rms initiated in recession, the dierence is 4:4% (= 44:2% minus 39:8%).
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Panel A in Table 5 shows that the average leverage is 40:89%, which is, naturally, close to the
average of 41:83% of our BBB-rated rm sample used for the matching. (The average leverage is
40:57%, 40:93%, and 41:45% for ve years, 20 years, and innite debt maturity, respectively.)
In Panel B, we compare leverage ratios in boom and recession. While optimal leverage is pro-
cyclical at initiation, it is counter-cyclical over time for the true cross-section of BBB-rated rms.
In particular, the average leverage is 36:94% in boom, and 46:20% in recession. The reason is that
the market value of equity is more sensitive to regime switches than the market value of debt,
making leverage counter-cyclical. This mechanism dominates the optimally pro-cyclical leverage
choice at initiation for our typical rms. The result mirrors the property we previously established
for the aggregate economy, and conrms that it holds also when matching to real empirical samples.
Finally, Panel C investigates the relationship between growth options and market leverage.
Regressing the average leverage of each rm on its average asset composition ratio in our empirical
BBB-rated rm sample yields a coecient of  0:165. We conduct the same regressions with the
averages of asset composition ratios and leverage ratios from each of the 1; 000 simulations of the
true cross-section. The average coecient from this regression is  0:184, close to its empirical
counterpart. Hence, the observed magnitude of the negative relationship between growth options
and market leverage is preserved during the simulation.
Our qualitative nding for the cross-sectional relationship between growth options and leverage
is widely accepted (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Barclay, Smith and Morellec, 2006; Johnson,
2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Consistent with the literature, the coecient is robustly negative.
Moreover, its quantitative size, implied by the 25% and 75% quantiles, is comparable to the one
in empirical studies. Fama and French (2002), for example, obtain a coecient of  0:096 in their
regression of market leverage on a similar ratio of asset composition and standard controls, and
Johnson (2003) nds that increasing the asset composition ratio by one decreases leverage by around
7:8 percentage points in a pooled regression.
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6.3. Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the results to variations in the critical input param-
eters. Additionally, we also show how our predictions are aected if we assume that the expansion
is nanced by issuing equity instead of selling assets.
To analyze the impact of preferences on our results, we show ten year credit spreads and the
simulated average leverage for  = 7:5 in the second column of Table 6, a value which is also
sometimes used in the literature (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Chen, 2010). All other parameters are
kept constant at their baseline levels from Table 1. The debt maturity is assumed to be ten years.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Lower risk aversion induces a smaller demand for precautionary savings, which increases the
real risk-free rate. At the same time, it raises the risk-neutral earnings drift, because risk prices for
systematic Brownian shocks (i) decrease. Both mechanisms reduce the default probability, leading
to the lower credit spreads and slightly lower leverage.
In column 3 of Table 6, we investigate the impact of the exercise costs on credit spreads and
leverage. As we are mainly interested in rms with intact expansion options, we present the
results for K equal to 350, i.e., a higher K than in the baseline case. (Lowering K induces many
growth rms to exercise their expansion option almost immediately.) Generally, credit spreads
and the average leverage are very similar to the ones of our baseline specication. For high asset
composition ratios, such as 2:2, credit spreads at initiation slightly increase because a higher K
induces a larger distance to the optimal exercise boundary compared to the baseline specication.
This increase in credit spreads from the larger distance arises because close to the exercise boundary,
credit spreads also reect the fact that the rm will imminently be converted into a rm with only
invested assets, and, hence, with lower credit risk. When simulating the true cross section, the
impact of increasing K from 310 to 350 on the average credit spread is below one basis point.
Finally, we also analyze in column 4 of Table 6 the case in which the exercise price of the
expansion option (K) is nanced by issuing additional equity instead of selling assets. Appendix
41
A.6 presents the solution for the value of corporate debt. New equity decreases the leverage after
exercise and, hence, lowers credit risk. As rms with a high asset composition ratio are close to
the endogenous exercise boundary where new equity-nancing occurs, credit spreads are strongly
reduced for typical growth rms compared to the benchmark model. In the simulation of the true
cross-section, however, the eect is relatively small because most rms have a large distance to the
exercise boundary. Especially those rms that contribute the most to the average credit spread,
i.e., distressed rms, are particularly far away from the exercise boundary. Additionally, Panel B
shows that the average leverage is only marginally aected.
The result for typical growth rms in column 4 shows that close to rms' exercise boundaries,
credit spreads are driven by the expected new nancing upon investment, and do not primarily
reect the nature of assets. This insight validates our focus on asset-nancing rather than on
equity-nancing of growth option exercises to analyze the isolated impact of the asset composition
on credit risk and corporate policy choices.
We conclude that while alternative specications and settings can have an impact on the quan-
titative results, our qualitative aggregate and cross-sectional predictions are robust.
7. Equity value premium
In this section, we investigate the value premium for equity implied by our model, i.e., the
dierence in the equity risk premium between value and growth rms. As in the analysis of credit
spreads, we show that considering the true cross-section is crucial when exploring the quantitative
implications of our model.
The following proposition presents the instantaneous equity risk premium, dened as the ex-
pected dierence between the instantaneous yield on corporate equity and the yield on the corre-
sponding risk-free security.
Proposition 3. The nominal instantaneous equity risk premium epi (X) of a rm is given by
epi (X) =
e0i(X)X
ei(X)
X;Ci 
C
i +
e0i(X)X
ei(X)
(X;Ci 
P;C + (P;id)2)  i(ej(X)
ei(X)
  1)(ei   1): (34)
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
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The rst term of the equity risk premium comes from the compensation for the systematic
volatility of stock returns caused by Brownian shocks. The second term accounts for the fact that
the equity premium is calculated in nominal terms. The last term is the jump risk premium, in
which (
ej(X)
ei(X)
  1) is the volatility of stock returns that is caused by Poisson shocks.
In Panel A of Table 7, we investigate the initial, instantaneous value premium for our cross-
section of matched BBB-rated rms. We report yearly equity premiums. At matching, rms
are sorted into ten portfolios based on their asset composition ratio.31 Portfolio one contains all
rms in the lowest asset composition ratio decile (value rms), and portfolio ten the ones in the
highest decile (growth rms).32 The average equity premium for each portfolio is calculated as
the equity value-weighted average of the instantaneous equity premiums of the matched rms in
the corresponding portfolio. The panel reports average equity premiums of 20 matchings after
the corresponding pre-matching simulations. The pattern across the portfolios at matching is in
accordance with the positive relationship between the book-to-market ratio and the equity returns
reported in the literature.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Because growth options are levered claims, growth rms are more volatile, which induces a
larger equity risk premium than for value rms. At the same time, however, growth rms hold
lower levels of debt. The average leverage in portfolio one, for example, is 61:99%, and the one
in portfolio ten is 28:82%. Consistent with the empirical literature (e.g., Bhandari (1988), Fama
and French (1992), and Gomes and Schmid (2010)), nancial leverage increases the equity risk
premium in our model. The eect of leverage dominates the impact of the volatility such that
value rms have a higher equity risk premium than growth rms. The yearly premiums in the
lowest and highest asset composition ratio deciles are 6:79% and 5:65%, respectively. The value
premium calculated as the dierence between these two premiums is 1:14%.
31We do not sort based on the market-to-book equity ratio for two reasons. First, the asset composition ratio
unambiguously identies value and growth rms in our model. Second, using the market-to-book equity ratio requires
to dene model-implied book asset values, and book values of debt. There is, however, no unique denition of book
values in our model, and dierent denitions inuence the sorting.
32The average asset composition ratio in the value portfolio is 0:99, and 2:08 in the growth portfolio.
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Panel B analyzes the impact of the dynamics of the true cross-section of rms on the value
premium. To this end, we simulate future earnings paths for each rm in our initial cross-section of
matched rms over ve years. The procedure is analogous to the one in the simulation approach for
credit spreads and leverages. However, we do not consider rms that have already exercised their
growth option. The reason is that, as our model does not incorporate new debt nancing, the equity
premium of exercised rms is very small due to the low leverage after option exercise. Additionally,
exercised rms have very large equity values. Hence, including them causes a heavy downward
bias of the equity premium when applying equity-weighting in the calculation of the average equity
premium.33 The average value-weighted equity premium in our entire simulated true cross-section
of BBB-rated rms is 5:69% per year, consistent with the average equity premium reported in the
literature (Campbell, Lo and MacKinley, 1997; Gomes and Schmid, 2010). Following the sorting
procedure proposed in Fama and French (1992), simulated rms are then sorted into ten dierent
portfolios at the beginning of each simulated year. We measure the average value-weighted equity
premium of each portfolio during the subsequent year. The rst line in Panel B shows that the
resulting value premium of 3:47%, given by the equity premium of portfolio one minus the equity
premium of portfolio ten, is much larger than in Panel A. The value premium calculated as the
dierence between the top and bottom portfolio quintiles is 1:45%. The second and third lines of
Panel B report the average leverage and asset composition ratios of each portfolio in the simulated
true cross-section.
Empirically, the yearly value premium is between 6:29% and 12:55% when comparing the top
and bottom book-to-market deciles (Fama and French, 2002; Patton and Timmermann, 2010; Ang
and Kristensen, 2011). Gomes and Schmid (2010) report 7:19% based on portfolio quintiles. Hence,
the results in Panel B show that our model explains about 28% to 55% of the value premium for
deciles. For quintiles, about 20% are explained.
The value premium is higher in Panel B than in Panel A because the equity risk premium is
an increasing and convex function of the leverage ratio. Hence, whenever the economy switches to
33The average ten year credit spread when omitting exercised rms is 98 bps, which is even higher than the model
predicted credit spread in the main case (see Panel D of Table 3).
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recession in the dynamic simulation, the equity risk premium of value rms with an initially larger
leverage increases, on average, more than the one of growth rms with an initially lower leverage.
Empirically, Choi (2010) conrms that a further leverage increase of already highly leveraged value
rms during times with large risk premiums contributes to higher value premiums. Consistent with
our simulation results, he argues that the joint dynamics of asset values and leverage drive, at least
partially, the value premium.34
A direct consequence of this dynamic source of the value premium is that it is strongly counter-
cyclical. In the simulation of the true cross-section of matched rms over ve years, the yearly
value premium based on portfolios sorted by asset composition ratio deciles is, on average, 8:74%
in recession, and 0:78% in boom. Based on quintiles, the value premium is 3:52% in recession,
and 0:41% in boom. Our result is consistent with the growing body of literature that shows that
value rms are particularly risky in bad times. For example, Petkova and Zhang (2005) and Chen,
Petkova and Zhang (2008) nd that the value eect is empirically much stronger in bad times than
in good periods.
In sum, our analysis shows that by simply exploring the cross-sectional dynamics of rms with
endogenous default and investment decisions a signicant portion of the value premium and its
counter-cyclical pattern can be explained.
8. Conclusion
It is now well-accepted that macroeconomic risk is central for understanding credit risk and
capital structure choices. Specically, defaults are more likely during recession, when they are
particularly costly and harder to bear. This counter-cyclicality increases the costs of debt for all
rms. But to explain the cross-sectional variation in apparently excessive costs of debt, we need
variation inside the rm. This paper formalizes the role of one particularly important aspect of
this heterogeneity, the asset composition of rms. It is not surprising that in principle the asset
34The nding that value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks has prompted many other explanations.
For example, Choi (2010) shows that xed operating costs can generate a value premium. Similarly, Zhang (2005)
argues that asymmetric adjustment costs change the underlying business risk of value rms.
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composition can be important for optimal capital structure. After all, economists have devoted
much eort to understanding the dierence between value and growth rms in terms of their
nancial structure, starting with Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986). Little was known, however,
about the quantitative importance of this factor and its relation with macroeconomic risk.
The present structural equilibrium model allows us to jointly analyze a rm's expansion policy
and nancial leverage in the presence of macroeconomic risk. We demonstrate that incorporating
the combination of these factors goes a long way towards explaining the empirically observed cross-
sectional variation in costs of debt, leverage, and equity risk premiums. Our model implies that
companies with a high portion of expansion options tend to be riskier in general, and, at the
same time, particularly sensitive to macroeconomic risk. They are not only more volatile (because
growth options represent levered claims), but also have a higher propensity to default in bad times
than rms with a low portion of expansion options. Thus, the default probability and its counter-
cyclicality are higher the greater the ratio of expansion options to total assets. Together with
higher marginal utility of the representative agent in recession, this relation (exacerbated by costly
liquidation in recession) implies higher costs of debt and more important endogenous shadow costs
of leverage for rms with growth options than for those with only invested assets. Thus, our
ndings explain why the credit spread puzzle is empirically more pronounced for growth rms, and
why growth rms hold less debt even after controlling for standard determinants of credit risk.
Moreover, because the economy is made up of a cross-sectional mix of rms, the model accounts,
in quantitatively fairly accurate ways, for the average credit spread puzzle. The model also yields
a counter-cyclical value premium for equity, consistent with the data.
We have studied one type of real options of rms, namely, growth options. However, rms have
a wide and varying range of options, including abandonment and shut-down options. A model
incorporating these options could, therefore, yield further cross-sectional predictions.
While recent research has made important progress in enhancing our understanding of average
credit risk, the cross-section of credit risk has not received sucient attention. Analyzing it empir-
ically is, fortunately, quite feasible. Liquid credit default swap quotes are now widely available on
a rm-by-rm basis, allowing researchers to investigate specic relationships between rm-specic
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characteristics such as growth options and credit spreads. Our paper also provides a theoretical
basis that can guide empirical research in this direction.
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Figure 1. Cross-Section of BBB-Rated Firms. This scatterplot shows the average leverage and
Tobin's Q for each observed BBB-rated rm over the period from 1995 to 2008.
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Figure 2. Optimal Exercise Boundary. The solid line shows the optimal exercise boundary in
boom for a range of scale parameters s. The dashed line represents the corresponding exercise
boundary in recession. The graph is drawn for optimal leverage with innite debt maturity. The
baseline parameter specication from Table 1 is used.
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Figure 3. Option Values. The solid line represents the value of the expansion option in boom for
a range of starting earnings between 0 and 10. The dashed line shows the corresponding values of
the same option in recession. The graph is drawn for optimal leverage with innite debt maturity.
The baseline parameter specication from Table 1 is used.
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Figure 4. Default Policy and Asset Composition. The solid line represents the default threshold
in boom for a range of asset composition ratios. The dashed line shows the default threshold in
recession. The graph is drawn for constant leverage (41.83%) at each point. Debt maturity is
assumed to be innite. The baseline parameter specication from Table 1 is used, with s being
varied to generate the desired asset composition ratio.
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Figure 5. Time Series of Market Leverage. The solid line shows the aggregate market leverage of
the simulated economy. The shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from
Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be innite.
Figure 6. Time Series of ACR. The solid line shows the aggregate asset composition ratio of
the simulated economy. The shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from
Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be innite.
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Figure 7. Monthly Default Rates. The solid line shows the percentage of rms that default during
a given month in the simulated economy. The shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard
parameters from Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be innite.
Figure 8. Monthly Expansion Rates. The solid line shows the percentage of rms that exercise
their expansion options during a given month in the simulated economy. The shaded areas represent
times of recession. Standard parameters from Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be
innite.
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Figure 9. Time Series of Credit Spread. The solid line shows the average credit spread of the
simulated economy. The shaded areas represent times of recession. Standard parameters from
Table 1 are used. Debt maturity is assumed to be innite.
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10. Tables
Table 1
Baseline Parameter Choice
This table describes our baseline scenario. Panel A contains the annualized parameters of a typical BBB-rated S&P
500 rm. Panels B and C show our parameter choice for the expansion option and the macro economy, respectively.
The asset composition ratio (ACR) is the value of the rm, divided by the value of the invested assets.
Parameter Boom Recession
Panel A. Firm Characteristics
Initial Value of After-Tax Earnings (X) 10 10
Tax Advantage of Debt () 0:15 0:15
Nominal Earnings Growth Rate (i) 0:0782  0:0401
Systematic Earnings Volatility (X;Ci ) 0:0834 0:1334
Recovery Rate (i) 0:7 0:5
Panel B. Expansion Option Parameters of a Typical Firm (ACR=1:6)
Exercise Price (K) 310 310
Scale Parameter if Initiated in Boom (s) 1:89
Scale parameter if Initiated in Recession (s) 2:05
Panel C. Economy
Rate of Leaving Regime i (i) 0:2718 0:4928
Consumption Growth Rate (i) 0:042 0.0141
Consumption Growth Volatility (Ci ) 0:0094 0:0114
Expected Ination Rate () 0:0342 0:0342
Systematic Price Index Volatility (P;C)  0:0035  0:0035
Idiosyncratic Price Index Volatility (P;id) 0:0132 0:0132
Rate of time preference () 0.015 0.015
Relative Risk Aversion () 10 10
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (	) 1.5 1.5
53
Table 2
Target Credit Spreads and Default Probabilities
This table lists our target credit spreads and default probabilities. Panel A reports annualized target average credit
spreads for various debt maturities. They are calculated as the BBB-rated bond minus treasury yields of Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007) and Duee (1998), net of a 35:5% non-default component. Credit spreads are quoted in basis
points. Panel B reports average cumulative issuer-weighted default rates in percent for BBB-debt over ve, ten, and
20 years for US rms (Moody's, 2010).
Panel A: Target Credit Spreads (in basis points)
Debt Maturity Short Medium Long
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) 74 74 92
Duee (1998) 96 95 128
Panel B: Historical BBB Default Probabilities (in percent)
Years 5 10 20
1920-2009 3.136 7.213 13.684
1970-2009 1.926 4.851 12.327
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Table 3
Implications for Credit Spreads
This table demonstrates the implications of our model for credit spreads of BBB-rated rms. The asset composition
ratio (ACR) is dened as rm value, divided by the value of the invested assets. Parameters are taken from Table 1,
and the leverage is set equal to 41:83%. In the one regime model, parameters are chosen to match their unconditional
mean. The standard two regime model is adapted from Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010b). Annualized credit
spreads for various debt maturities are calculated as the coupon divided by the debt value, minus the yield on an
otherwise identical riskfree bond. They are quoted in basis points. Credit spreads of typical rms in Panels B and
C are obtained by weighting the credit spreads in boom and recession by the average expected time spent in each
regime, respectively. Panel D contains the average credit spreads of our simulated true cross-section of BBB-rated
rms.
Debt Maturity (Years) 5 10 20
Panel A: One Regime Model
Average Firm 18 29 41
Panel B: Standard Two Regime Model
With Only Invested Assets
Average Firm 35 56 78
Panel C: Two Regime Model
With Expansion Option
Invested Assets (ACR=1) 24 39 55
Average Firm (ACR=1.6) 45 66 84
Growth Firm (ACR=2.2) 47 69 86
Panel D: Two Regime Model
With True Cross-Section
Average Credit Spread 57 81 100
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Table 4
Implications for Default Rates
This table shows the simulated cumulative default rates in percent of our true cross-section of BBB-rated rms.
Panels A to D vary the underlying debt maturity used to calculate the default thresholds in our model.
Years 5 10 20
Panel A: Innite Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 2.24 6.54 13.76
Median Default Rates 0.84 3.07 9.34
25% Quantile of Default Rates 0.42 1.12 3.35
75% Quantile of Default Rates 2.37 9.07 19.80
Panel B: 20 Years Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 4.39 10.72 18.67
Median Default Rates 1.81 6.00 13.81
25% Quantile of Default Rates 0.70 2.23 5.44
75% Quantile of Default Rates 4.88 14.92 26.57
Panel C: 10 Years Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 6.30 13.61 21.92
Median Default Rates 2.79 8.09 16.95
25% Quantile of Default Rates 1.12 3.49 7.11
75% Quantile of Default Rates 7.39 19.39 32.50
Panel D: 5 Years Debt Maturity
Average Default Rates 8.05 16.32 25.09
Median Default Rates 4.04 10.60 20.22
25% Quantile of Default Rates 1.67 4.60 9.34
75% Quantile of Default Rates 10.32 23.36 36.75
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Table 5
Implications for Leverage
This table demonstrates the implications of our model for the leverage features of the true cross-section of BBB-rated
rms. Leverage ratios (given in percent) are calculated as the market value of debt divided by the market value of
the rm. The asset composition ratio (ACR) is dened as rm value, divided by the value of the invested assets.
Parameters are taken from Table 1. The debt maturity is assumed to be ten years.
Panel A: Unconditional Leverage
Average Leverage 40.89
Panel B: Conditional Leverage
Regime Boom Recession
Average Leverage 36.94 46.20
Median Leverage 34.36 44.19
25% Quantile 22.49 29.88
75% Quantile 48.51 60.39
Panel C: Regression of Leverage on ACR
Average Coecient -0.184
Median Coecient -0.184
25% Quantile -0.268
75% Quantile -0.096
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Table 6
Credit Spreads and Leverage for Alternative Specications
This table shows annualized ten year credit spreads and simulated average leverage ratios (given in percent) of
BBB-rated rms for alternative specications of our basic model. The asset composition ratio (ACR) is dened as
rm value, divided by the value of the invested assets. Credit spreads are calculated as the coupon divided by the
debt value, minus the yield on an otherwise identical risk-free bond. They are quoted in basis points. The altered
parameter is indicated in the rst line, all other parameters are taken from Table 1. Credit spreads in the rst three
lines of Panel A for typical rms at issue are obtained by weighting the credit spreads in boom and recession by
the expected times spent in each regime, respectively. The leverage is set equal to 41:83% to generate the credit
spreads of typical rms. The last row in Panel A contains average credit spreads of our simulated true cross-section
of BBB-rated rms. Panel B shows simulated average leverage ratios for BBB-rated rms. The debt maturity is
assumed to be ten years.
Specication  = 7:5 K = 350 Equity Financing
Panel A: 10 Year Credit Spreads
Invested Assets (ACR=1) 33 39 39
Average Firm (ACR=1.6) 53 67 65
Growth Firm (ACR=2.2) 56 72 58
True Cross-Section 68 81 77
Panel B: Unconditional Leverage
Average Leverage 41.10 41.22 41.14
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Table 7
Equity Premiums of Portfolios Formed on the Asset Composition Ratio
This table shows the yearly equity premiums for the ten dierent portfolios based on the deciles of the asset compo-
sition ratio (ACR). The equity premium for each portfolio is calculated as the equity value-weighted average of the
premiums of all rms within the corresponding portfolio. It is reported as the average yearly premium expressed in
percent. The leverage for each portfolio (given in percent) is obtained by averaging over rms' individual leverage in
the corresponding portfolio, in which the individual leverage is calculated as the ratio of the market value of debt to
total rm value. The asset composition ratio (ACR) is dened as the portfolio average of the rm values divided by
the values of the invested assets. The debt maturity is assumed to be ten years.
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: Initial Cross-Section
Equity Premium 6.79 6.07 6.29 5.73 5.71 5.37 5.37 5.36 5.25 5.65
Panel B: Simulated True Cross-Section
Equity Premium 9.48 6.74 6.36 5.95 5.83 5.94 5.71 5.72 5.73 6.01
Leverage 65.70 56.05 52.17 47.83 44.63 41.50 38.83 36.30 33.78 33.85
ACR 0.96 1.07 1.15 1.22 1.30 1.38 1.48 1.58 1.71 1.92
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A. Appendix
A.1. The stochastic discount factor
Solving the Bellman equation associated with the consumption problem of the representative agent, it
can be shown that the stochastic discount factor mt follows the dynamics (3) (see Bhamra, Kuehn and
Strebulaev, 2010b; Chen, 2010). The parameters hB , hR solve
0 = 
1  
1   h
 
i +

(1  ) i   1
2
 (1  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1  

h1 i + i

h1 j   h1 i

: (A-1)
One-regime model. To isolate the eect of business cycle risk, we also consider the model with only one
economic regime. The dynamics of the stochastic discount factor then read
dmt
mt
=  rdt  dWCt : (A-2)
The real interest rate r and the risk price  are given by
r = r = +    1
2
 (1 + )
 
Ci
2
; (A-3)
 = C : (A-4)
The nominal interest rate is calculated as
rn = r +    2P   P;C; (A-5)
and the expected growth rate is given by
~ =   X;C   + P;C   P;id2 : (A-6)
The earnings-price ratio simplies to
y 1 = rn   ~; (A-7)
and the total earnings volatility is
~ =
q
(X;C)
2
+ (P;id)
2
+ (X;id)
2
: (A-8)
A.2. The value of the growth option
Proof of Proposition 1. For each regime i, the option is exercised immediately whenever X  Xi (option
exercise region); otherwise it is optimal to wait (option continuation region). This structure results in the
following system of ODEs for the value function:
For 0  X < XB :
rnBGB(X) = ~BXG
0
B(X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2G00B(X) + ~B (GR(X) GB(X))
rnRGR(X) = ~RXG
0
R(X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2G00R(X) + ~R (GB(X) GR(X)) :
(A-9)
For XB  X < XR :
GB(X) = sXyB  K
rnRGR(X) = ~RXG
0
R(X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2G00R(X) + ~R (sXyB  K  GR(X)) :
(A-10)
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For X  XR : 
GB(X) = sXyB  K
GR(X) = sXyR  K: (A-11)
Whenever the process X is in the option continuation region, which corresponds to System (A-9) and the
second equation of (A-10), the required rate of return rni (left-hand side) must be equal to the realized rate
of return (right-hand side). The latter is obtained by Ito's lemma for regime switches. Here, the last term
accounts for a possible jump in the value of the growth option due to a regime switch. It is calculated as
the instantaneous probability of a regime shift, ~B or ~R; times the associated change in the value of the
option. The rst equation of (A-10) and the System (A-11) state the payo of the option at exercise, since
the process is in the option exercise region in these cases. The boundary conditions are given by:
lim
X&0
Gi (X) = 0; i = B;R (A-12)
lim
X&XB
GR(X) = lim
X%XB
GR(X) (A-13)
lim
X&XB
G0R(X) = lim
X%XB
G0R(X) (A-14)
lim
X%XR
GR (X) = sXRyR  K (A-15)
lim
X%XB
GB (X) = sXByB  K: (A-16)
Condition (A-12) ensures that the option value goes to zero as earnings approach zero. Conditions (A-13)
and (A-14) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of the value function in recession at the
exercise boundary in boom. The remaining conditions (A-15)-(A-16) are the value-matching conditions at
the exercise boundaries in boom and recession, respectively.
The functional form of the solution is given by
Gi(X) =
8<:
Ai3X
3 + Ai4X
4 0  X < XB; i = B;R
C1X
R1 + C2X
R2 + C3X + C4 XB  X < XR; i = R
sXyi  K X  Xi i = B;R;
(A-17)
in which AB3; AB4; AR1; AR2; C1; C2; C3; C4; 3; 4; 
R
1 ; and 
R
2 are real-valued parameters to be determined.
We rst consider the region 0  X < XB; and plug the functional form Gi(X) = Ai3X3 + Ai4X4 into
both equations of (A-9). Comparison of coecients yields that ABk is a multiple of ARk, k = 3; 4; with the
factor lk :=
1
~B
(rnB +
~B   ~Bk   12 ~2Bk(k   1)), i.e., ARk = lk ABk: Using this relation and comparing
coecients, we nd that 3 and 4 correspond to the positive roots of the quartic equation
~R +
1
2
~2R(   1)  ~R   rnR

~B +
1
2
~2B(   1)  ~B   rnB

= ~R~B: (A-18)
The reason for taking the positive roots is given by boundary condition (A-12).
Next, we consider the region XB  X < XR. Plugging the functional form GR(X) = C1X1 + C2X2 +
C3X + C4 into the second equation of (A-10), we nd by comparison of coecients that
R1;2 =
1
2
  ~R
~2R

vuut1
2
  ~R
~2R
2
+
2

rnR +
~R

~2R
C3 = ~R
syB
rnR   ~R + ~R
(A-19)
C4 =  ~R K
rnR +
~R
:
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The remaining unknown parameters are AB3; AB4; C1 and C2: Plugging the functional form (A-17) into
conditions (A-13)-(A-16) yields
C1X
R1
B +
C2X
R2
B +
C3XB + C4 = l3 AB3X
3
B +
l4 AB4X
4
B (A-20)
C1
R
1 X
R1
B +
C2
R
2 X
R2
B +
C3XB = l3 AB33X
3
B +
l44 AB4X
4
B (A-21)
C1X
R1
R +
C2X
R2
R +
C3XR + C4 = syRXR  K (A-22)
AB3X
3
B +
AB4X
4
B = syBXB  K: (A-23)
This four-dimensional system is linear in its four unknowns AB3; AB4; C1 and C2: We dene the matrices
M :=
26664
l3X
3
B
l4X
4
B  X
R
1
B  X
R
2
B
l33X
3
B
l44X
4
B  R1 X
R
1
B  R2 X
R
2
B
0 0 X
R1
R X
R2
R
X3B X
4
B 0 0
37775
b :=
2664
C3XB + C4
C3XB
  C3XR   C4 + syRXR  K
syBXB  K
3775 ;
such that M

AB3 AB4 C1 C2
T
= b. Hence, the solution to the remaining unknowns is given by
AB3 AB4 C1 C2
T
= M 1b: (A-24)
Relative price change sensitivity. The relative price change sensitivity is
G0i (X)
Gi (X)
=
8><>:
3 Ai3X
3 1+ Ai44X4 1
Ai3X3+ Ai4X4
X < XB; i = B;R
C11X
1 1+ C22X2 1+ C3
C1X1+ C2X2+ C3X+ C4
XB  X < XR; i = R
syi
syiX K X  Xi i = B;R:
(A-25)
The unlevered value of the growth option. The unlevered value of the growth option can be calculated
by imposing the smooth-pasting boundary conditions at option exercise:
lim
X%XunlevR
Gunlev
0
R (X) = syR (A-26)
lim
X%XunlevB
Gunlev
0
B (X) = syB : (A-27)
The solution method is analogous to the one for the levered option value up to and including (A-19).
Then, System (A-20)-(A-23) is augmented by the two equations corresponding to the additional boundary
conditions:
Cunlev1 
R
1
 
XunlevR
R1  1 + Cunlev2 R2  XunlevR R2  1 + C3 = syR (A-28)
AunlevB3 3
 
XunlevB
3 1
+ AunlevB4 4
 
XunlevB
4 1
= syB: (A-29)
The full system is six-dimensional with the six unknowns AunlevB3 ;
AunlevB4 ;
Cunlev1 ,
Cunlev2 X
unlev
B , and X
unlev
R ;
linear in the rst four unknowns, and non-linear in the last two unknowns. It is solved numerically.
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One-regime model. Denote the investment boundary by X1: The system to solve is given by:
rnG (X) = ~XG0 (X) + ~
2
2 X
2G00 (X) X < X1
G (X) = sXy  K X  X1: (A-30)
The boundary conditions are given by a value matching condition and the fact that the option must become
worthless when the earnings approach zero:
lim
X&0
G (X) = 0 (A-31)
lim
X%X1
G (X) = syX1  K (A-32)
The functional form of the solution is
G (X) =

AX1 X < X1
sXy  K X  X1; (A-33)
in which A and 1 are real-valued parameters to be determined. It is straightforward to show that
1 =
1
2
  ~
~2
+
s
1
2
  ~
~2
2
+
2rn
~2
(A-34)
A = (syX1  K)X 11 : (A-35)
The relative price change sensitivity of the option is
G0 (X)
G (X)
=
 1
X X < X1
sy
syX K X  X1:
(A-36)
The unlevered value of the option satises the additional smooth-pasting condition
lim
X%Xunlev1
Gunlev
0
(X) = sy: (A-37)
A.3. Firms with only invested assets
The solution for the values of corporate securities is based on Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006).
The valuation of corporate debt. Without loss of generality, we consider the case in which the default
boundary in boom is lower than in recession, i.e., D^B < D^R: An investor holding corporate debt requires an
instantaneous return equal to the risk-free rate rni : Once the rm defaults, debtholders receive a fraction i
of the asset value Xyi. The required rate of return on debt must be equal to the realized rate of return plus
the coupon proceeds from debt. Therefore, an application of Ito's lemma with regime switches shows that
debt satises the following system of ODEs:
For 0  X  D^B : 
d^B(X) = BXyB
d^R(X) = RXyR:
(A-38)
For D^B < X  D^R :(
rnB d^B(X) = c+ ~BXd^
0
B(X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d^00B(X) + ~B

RXyR   d^B(X)

d^R(X) = RXyR:
(A-39)
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For X > D^R : 8<: r
n
B d^B(X) = c+ ~BXd^
0
B(X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d^00B(X) + ~B

d^R(X)  d^B(X)

rnRd^R(X) = c+ ~RXd^
0
R(X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d^00R(X) + ~R

d^B(X)  d^R(X)

:
(A-40)
The boundary conditions read
lim
X!1
d^i (X)
X
< 1; i = B;R (A-41)
lim
X&D^R
d^B(X) = lim
X%D^R
d^B(X) (A-42)
lim
X&D^R
d^0B(X) = lim
X%D^R
d^0B(X) (A-43)
lim
X&D^B
d^B (X) = BDByB (A-44)
lim
X&D^B
d^R (X) = RDRyR: (A-45)
Condition (A-41) is the no-bubbles condition. The remaining boundary conditions are the value-matching
conditions (A-42), (A-44), and (A-45), and the smooth-pasting condition at the higher default threshold
D^R for the debt function in boom d^B(); Eq. (A-43). As debtholders do not choose the optimal default
thresholds, there are no smooth-pasting conditions at default to be considered. The functional form of the
solution is
d^i(X) =
8<:
iXyi X  D^i i = B;R
C^1X
B1 + C^2X
B2 + C3X + C4 D^B < X  D^R; i = B
A^i1X
1 + A^i2X
2 +Ai5 X > D^R; i = B;R;
(A-46)
in which A^B1; A^B2; A^R1; A^R2; AB5; AR5; C^1; C^2; C3; C4; 1; 2; 
B
1 ; and 
B
2 are real-valued parameters to be
determined.
We rst consider the region X > D^R; and use the standard approach of plugging the functional form
d^i(X) = A^i1X
1 + A^i2X
2 + Ai5 into both equations of (A-40). Comparing coecients and solving the
resulting two-dimensional system of equations for Ai5, we nd that
Ai5 =
c

rnj +
~i + ~j

rni r
n
j + r
n
j
~i + rni
~j
=
c
rpi
; (A-47)
and that A^Bk is always a multiple of A^Rk, k = 1; 2; with the factor lk :=
1
~B
(rnB+
~B ~Bk  12 ~2Bk(k 1)),
i.e., A^Rk = lkA^Bk: Using these results and comparing coecients again, we obtain that 1 and 2 are the
negative roots of the quartic equation
~R +
1
2
~2R(   1)  ~R   rnR

~B +
1
2
~2B(   1)  ~B   rnB

= ~R~B: (A-48)
The reason for taking the negative roots is the no-bubbles condition for debt stated in (A-41).
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Next, we consider the region D^B  X  D^R: Plugging the functional form dB(X) = C^1XB1 + C^2XB2 +
C3X + C4 into the rst equation of (A-39), we nd by comparison of coecients that
B1;2 =
1
2
  ~B
~2B

vuut1
2
  ~B
~2B
2
+
2

rnB +
~B

~2B
C3 =
~BRyR
rnB +
~B   ~B
(A-49)
C4 =
c
rnB +
~B
:
The remaining unknown parameters are A^B1; A^B2; C^1 and C^2: We plug the functional form (A-46) into
conditions (A-42)-(A-45), and obtain a four-dimensional linear system in the four unknowns A^B1; A^B2; C^1
and C^2 :
A^B1D^
1
R + A^B2D^
2
R +AB5 = C^1D^
B1
R + C^2D^
B2
R + C3D^R + C4
A^B11D^
1
R + A^B22D^
2
R = C^1
B
1 D^
B1
R + C^2
B
2 D^
B2
R + C3D^R
BD^ByB = C^1D^
B1
R + C^2D^
B2
R + C3D^R + C4
l1A^B1D^
1
R + l2A^B2D^
2
R +AR5 = RD^RyR:
(A-50)
We dene the matrices
M^ :=
266664
D^1R D^
2
R  D^
B
1
R  D^
B
2
R
1D^
1
R 2D^
2
R  B1 D^
B
1
R  B2 D^
B
2
R
0 0 D^
B1
R D^
B2
R
l1D^
1
R l2D^
2
R 0 0
377775
b^ :=
2664
C3D^R + C4  AB5
C3D^R
BD^ByB   C3D^R   C4
RD^RyR  AR5
3775 ;
such that M^

A^B1 A^B2 C^1 C^2
T
= b^. Hence, the solution of the unknowns is given by
A^B1 A^B2 C^1 C^2
T
= M^ 1b^: (A-51)
Default policy. The value of equity is calculated as rm value minus the value of debt. The rm value
consists of the value of assets in place plus the value of the option and the tax shield minus default costs.
Once debt has been issued, managers select the ex-post default policy that maximizes the value of equity.
Formally, the default policy is determined by equating the rst derivative of the equity value to zero at the
corresponding default boundary: 
e^0B(D^

B) = 0
e^0R(D^

R) = 0:
(A-52)
We solve this problem numerically.
Capital structure. Denote by f^i (X) the rm value of a rm with only invested assets, given optimal
ex-post default thresholds. The ex-ante optimal coupon of a rm solves
c^ := argmaxc^f^

i (X): (A-53)
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One-regime model. Let D^1 be the default threshold. Note that for a risk-neutral agent, the model
corresponds to the one of Leland (1994). Equations (A-5)-(A-8) provide the parameters used in the setup
and solution of the one-regime model. Postulating that the required return must be equal to the expected
realized return plus the proceeds from debt, we nd the following system:
rnd^(X) = c+ ~Xd^0(X) + ~
2
2 X
2d^00(X) X > D^
d^(X) = Xy X  D^: (A-54)
The boundary conditions are the no-bubbles condition, as well as value-matching at default:
lim
X!1
d^(X)
X
< 1
lim
X&D^
d^ (X) = yD^: (A-55)
The functional form of the solution is
d^(X) =

yX X < D^
B^X2 +A5 X  D^; (A-56)
in which B^ and 2 are real-valued parameters. It is straightforward to show that
A5 =
c
r
(A-57)
2 =
1
2
  ~
~2
 
s
1
2
  ~
~2
2
+
2rn
~2
(A-58)
B^ =

yD^   c
rn

D^ 2 : (A-59)
The default policy and capital structure can be determined analogously to the two-regime model.
A.4. Firms with invested assets and an expansion option
As in the main text, we consider the caseDB < DR, D^B < D^R; andXR > XB . We present a constructive
proof for the valuation of corporate debt.
Proof of Proposition 2. For brevity of notation, dene s := s + 1: An investor holding corporate debt
requires an instantaneous return equal to the nominal risk-free rate rni . Hence, an application of Ito's lemma
with regime switches shows that debt satises the following system of ODEs:
For 0  X  DB : 
dB (X) = B
 
XyB +G
unlev
B (X)

dR (X) = R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-60)
For DB < X  DR : 8<:
rnBdB (X) = c+ ~BXd
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d00B (X)
+~B
 
R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)
  dB (X)
dR (X) = R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-61)
For DR < X < XB :
rnBdB (X) = c+ ~BXd
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d00B (X) + ~B (dR (X)  dB (X))
rnRdR (X) = c+ ~RXd
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d00R (X) + ~R (dB (X)  dR (X)) :
(A-62)
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For XB  X < XR :8<: dB (X) = d^B

sX   KyB

rndR (X) = c+ ~RXd
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d00R (X) + ~R

d^B

sX   KyB

  dR (X)

:
(A-63)
For X  XR : 8<: dB (X) = d^B

sX   KyB

dR (X) = d^R

sX   KyR

:
(A-64)
In System (A-60), the rm is in the default region in both boom and recession. In this region, debtholders
receive i
 
Xyi +G
unlev
i (X)

at default. As the default boundary in boom is lower than the one in recession,
System (A-61) corresponds to the rm being in the continuation region in boom, and in the default region in
recession. For the continuation region in boom, the left-hand side of the rst equation is the rate of return
required by investors for holding corporate debt for one unit of time. The right-hand side is the realized rate
of return, computed by Ito's lemma as the expected change in the value of debt plus the coupon payment
c. The last term captures the possible jump in the value of debt in case of a regime switch, which triggers
immediate default. Similarly, equations (A-62) describe the case in which the rm is in the continuation
region in both boom and recession. The next system, (A-63), deals with the case in which the rm is in the
exercise region in boom, and in the continuation region in recession. After exercising the option, the rm
owns total assets in place with value Xyi + sXyi   K, reecting the notion that the exercise costs of the
growth option are nanced by selling assets. The value of debt must then be equal to the value of debt of a
rm with only invested assets, i.e., dB(X) = d^B((s+ 1)X   KyB ), which is the rst equation in (A-63). The
second equation in this case is obtained by the same approach as in (A-62), in which the last term captures
the fact that a regime switch from recession to boom triggers immediate exercise of the expansion option.
Finally, equations (A-64) describe the case in which the rm is in the exercise region in both boom and
recession. The system is subject to the following boundary conditions:
lim
X&DR
dB (X) = lim
X%DR
dB (X) (A-65)
lim
X&DR
d0B (X) = lim
X%DR
d0B (X) (A-66)
lim
X&DB
dB (X) = B
 
DByB +G
unlev
B (DB)

(A-67)
lim
X&DR
dR (X) = R
 
DRyR +G
unlev
R (DR)

(A-68)
lim
X&XB
dR (X) = lim
X%XB
dR (X) (A-69)
lim
X&XB
d0R (X) = lim
X%XB
d0R (X) (A-70)
lim
X%XB
dB (X) = d^B

sXB   K
yB

(A-71)
lim
X%XR
dR (XR) = d^R

sXR   K
yR

: (A-72)
(A-65) and (A-66) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the debt value in boom at
the default boundary in recession. Similarly, (A-69) and (A-70) are the corresponding conditions for the
debt value in recession at the option exercise boundary in boom. (A-67) and (A-68) are the value-matching
conditions at the default thresholds, and (A-71) and (A-72) are the value-matching conditions at the option
exercise boundaries. The default thresholds and option exercise boundaries are chosen by equityholders,
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and, hence, we do not have the corresponding smooth-pasting conditions for debt. To solve this system, we
start with the functional form of the solution:
di (X) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
i
 
Xyi +G
unlev
i (X)

X  Di i = B;R;
C1X
B1 + C2X
B2 + C3X + C4
+C5X
3 + C6X
4
DB < X  DR; i = B
Ai1X
1 +Ai2X
2
+Ai3X
3 +Ai4X
4 +Ai5
DR < X  XB; i = B;R
B1X
R1 +B2X
R2 + Z (X) +B4 XB < X  XR; i = R
d^i

sX   Kyi

X > Xi; i = B;R;
(A-73)
in which AB1; AB2; AR1; AR2; C1; C2; C3; C4; C5; C6; B1; B2; B4; 
B
1 ; 
B
2 ; 
R
1 ; 
R
2 ; 1; 2; 3; and 4 are real-
valued parameters to be determined (or to be conrmed). Z(X), as stated in the sixth line of (A-73),
can be expressed in closed form using Gauss' hypergeometric function. It will be given explicitly in the
following calculations.
We rst consider the region DR < X  XB : Plugging the functional form di(X) = Ai1X1 + Ai2X2 +
Ai3X
3 +Ai4X
4 +Ai5 into both equations of (A-62) and comparing coecients, we nd that
Ai5 =
c

rnj +
~i + ~j

rni r
n
j + r
n
j
~i + rni
~j
=
c
rpi
: (A-74)
As before, ABk is always a multiple of ARk, k = 1; : : : ; 4; with the factor lk :=
1
~B
(rnB +
~B   ~Bk  
1
2 ~
2
Bk(k   1)); i.e., ARk = lkABk: Using this relation and comparing coecients, we nd that 1; 2; 3;
and 4 correspond to the roots of the quartic Eq. (A-48), which is given by
~R +
1
2
~2R(   1)  ~R   rnR

~B +
1
2
~2B(   1)  ~B   rnB

= ~R~B: (A-75)
By arguments of Guo (2001), this quartic equation always has four distinct real roots, two of them being
negative, and two positive. The value of debt in both regimes will be subject to boundary conditions from
both below (default) and above (exercise of expansion option). To meet all boundary conditions, we need
four terms with the corresponding factors Aik as well as exponents k; which requires usage of all four roots
of (A-75). The no-bubbles condition is already implemented in the value function d^i of a rm with only
invested assets and, hence, does not need to be imposed again. The unknown parameters for this region are
ABk; k = 1; : : : ; 4:
Next, we consider the region DB  X  DR: Plugging the functional form dB(X) = C1XB1 +C2XB2 +
C3X + C4 + C5X
3 + C6X
4 into the second equation of (A-61), we nd by comparison of coecients that
B1;2 =
1
2
  ~B
~2B

vuut1
2
  ~B
~2B
2
+
2

rnB +
~B

~2B
(A-76)
C3 = ~B
RyR
rnB +
~B   ~B
(A-77)
C4 =
c
rnB +
~B
(A-78)
C5 = R
l3
l3
AunlevB3 (A-79)
C6 = R
l4
l4
AunlevB4 : (A-80)
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The unknown parameters left for this region are C1 and C2:
Finally, consider the region XB < X  XR. The corresponding dierential equation for i = R is (see
(A-63)): 
rnR +
~R

dR(X) = c+ ~RXd
0
R(X) +
1
2
~2RX
2d00R(X) + ~Rd^B(sX  
K
yB
): (A-81)
To solve this inhomogeneous dierential equation, we use a standard approach by rst nding a fundamen-
tal system of solutions of the homogeneous dierential equation, and then calculating the solution of the
inhomogeneous equation as the sum of the solutions of the homogeneous equation and a particular solution
of the inhomogeneous equation (Polyanin and Zaitsev, 2003, pages 21-23).
(A-81) is equivalent to
X2d00R(X) +
2~R
~2R
Xd0R(X) 
2

rnR +
~R

~2R
dR(X) =   2c
~2R
  2
~R
~2R
d^B(sX   K
yB
): (A-82)
Therefore, the corresponding homogeneous dierential equation is
X2d00R(X) +
2~R
~2R
Xd0R(X) 
2

rnR +
~R

~2R
dR(X) = 0: (A-83)
A fundamental system of solutions is given by fz1; z2g ; with
z1 := X
R1 ;
z2 := X
R2 ;
and
R1;2 =
1
2
  ~R
~2R

vuut1
2
  ~R
~2R
2
+
2

rnR +
~R

~2R
: (A-84)
These solutions can be calculated by plugging the functional form into the homogeneous ODE (A-83), and
solving for R1;2:
For notational convenience, we now dene f2 := X
2; f1 :=
2~R
~2R
X; f0 :=   2(r
n
R+
~R)
~2R
; and
g (X) :=   2c
~2R
  2
~R
~2R
d^B(sX   K
yB
): (A-85)
These notations allow to write the ODE (A-82) as
f2d
00
R(X) + f1d
0
R(X) + f0dR(X) = g(X): (A-86)
The general solution of this inhomogeneous ODE is given by
dR (X) = B1z1 +B2z2 + z2
Z
z1
g
f2
dX
W| {z }
=:I1(X)
 z1
Z
z2
g
f2
dX
W| {z }
=:I2(X)
; (A-87)
in which W = z1z
0
2   z2z01 is the Wronskian determinant, and B1 and B2 are coecients (see e.g. Polyanin
and Zaitsev (2003), page 22, (7)). The rst two terms of Eq. A-87 are a linear combination of the solutions
of the homogeneous ODE, and the last two terms are a particular solution of the inhomogeneous ODE.
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We start by calculating the Wronskian determinant
W = z1z
0
2   z2z01
= R2 X
R1 X
R
2  1   R1 X
R
1  1X
R
2
=
 
R2   R1

X
R
1 +
R
2  1: (A-88)
Hence, the integral I1 (X) is given by
I1 (X) =
Z
z1
g
f2
dX
W
=
Z
X
R
1 X 2
1
R2   R1
X1 
R
1  R2 g(X)dX
=
1
R2   R1
Z
X 1 
R
2 g(X)dX (A-89)
=
1
R2   R1
Z
X 1 
R
2
 
  2c
~2R
  2
~R
~2R
d^B

sX   K
yB
!
dX
=
1
R2   R1
Z
X 1 
R
2

  2c
~2R
 2
~R
~2R

A^B1

sX   K
yB
1
+ A^B2

sX   K
yB
2
+AB5
!
dX
=   2
~RA^B1 
R2   R1

~2R
Z
X 1 
R
2

sX   K
yB
1
dX| {z }
=:I11(X)
  2
~RA^B2 
R2   R1

~2R
Z
X 1 
R
2

sX   K
yB
2
dX| {z }
=:I12(X)
(A-90)
+
2AB5

~R + r
n
R

 
R2   R1

R2 ~
2
R
X 
R
2 :
We use the denition of the function g (X), see (A-85), and the solution of the debt value of a rm with only
invested assets d^R (), see (A-46).
The integrals I11(X) and I12(X) can be evaluated immediately with standard computer algebra packages.
Alternatively, using the integral representation of Gauss' hypergeometric function 2F1 (; ; ; ) ; we can write
the closed-form solution of the integrals as
I11(X) =
1
1   R2
s1X1 
R
2
2F1

 1; R2   1; R2   1 + 1; 
K
sXyB

; (A-91)
I12(X) =
1
2   R2
s2X2 
R
2
2F1

 2; R2   2; R2   2 + 1; 
K
sXyB

: (A-92)
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Plugging the solutions (A-91) and (A-92) into the expression for the integral I1, (A-90) yields
I1 (X) =   2
~RA^B1 
R2   R1

~2R
1
1   R2
s1X1 
R
2
2F1

 1; R2   1; R2   1 + 1; 
K
sXyB

  2
~RA^B2 
R2   R1

~2R
1
2   R2
s2X2 
R
2
2F1

 2; R2   2; R2   2 + 1; 
K
sXyB

(A-93)
+
2AB5

~R + r
n
R

 
R2   R1

R2 ~
2
R
X 
R
2 :
Similarly, we nd for the second integral I2(X):
I2 (X) =   2
~RA^B1 
R2   R1

~2R
1
1   R1
s1X1 
R
1
2F1

 1; R1   1; R2   1 + 1; 
K
sXyB

  2
~RA^B2 
R2   R1

~2R
1
2   R1
s2X2 
R
1
2F1

 2; R1   2; R2   2 + 1; 
K
sXyB

(A-94)
+
2AB5

~R + r
n
R

 
R2   R1

R1 ~
2
R
X 
R
1 :
Plugging (A-93) and (A-94) into (A-87) and simplifying, we nally obtain the solution
dR (X) = B1X
R1 +B2X
R2 + Z(X) +B4; (A-95)
with
Z(X) =
X
i;k=1;2
2( 1)i+1~RskA^Bk
~2R
 
R2   R1
  
k   Ri
Xk2F1 k; Ri ; Ri   k + 1;  KsXyB

(A-96)
B4 = ~R
c
rpi

rnR +
~R
 + c
rnR +
~R
; (A-97)
for some parameters B1 and B2 determined by the boundary conditions. The rst derivative Z
0 (X) can be
calculated as follows:
Z 0(X) =
d
dX
Z(X)
=
d
dX

X
R
2 I1 (X) XR2 I2 (X)

= R2 X
R2  1I1 (X) +
1
R2   R1
X
R
2  1X 1 
R
1 g (X)
 R1 X
R
1 I2 (X)  1
R2   R1
X
R
1 X 1 
R
1 g (X)
= R2 X
R2  1I1 (X)  R1 X
R
1  1I2 (X)
=
X
i;k=1;2
2( 1)i+1~RskA^BkRi
~2R
 
R2   R1
  
k   Ri
Xk 12F1 k; Ri ; Ri   k + 1;  KsXyB

: (A-98)
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To solve for the unknown parameters AB1; AB2; AB3; AB4; C1; C2; B1 and B2; we plug the functional form
(A-73) into the system of boundary conditions (A-65) - (A-72):
4X
k=1
ABkD
k
R +AB5 = C1D
B1
R + C2D
B2
R + C3X + C4 + C5X
3 + C6X
4
4X
k=1
ABkkD
k
R = C1
B
1 D
B1
R + C2
B
2 D
B2
R + C3X + C53X
3 + C64X
4
B
 
DByB +G
unlev
B (DB)

= C1D
B1
B + C2D
B2
B + C3DB + C4 + C5D
3
B + C6D
4
B
4X
k=1
lkABkD
k
R +AR5 = R
 
DRyR +G
unlev
R (DR)

4X
k=1
lkABkX
k
B +AR5 = B1X
R1
B +B2X
R2
B + Z(XB) +B4 (A-99)
4X
k=1
lkABkkX
k
B = B1
R
1 X
R1
B +B2
R
2 X
R2
B +XBZ
0(XB)
4X
k=1
ABkX
k
B +AB5 = d^B

sXB   K
yB

B1X
R1
R +B2X
R2
R + Z(XR) +B4 = d^R

sXR   K
yR

:
Using matrix notation, we write
M :=
266666666666664
D1R D
2
R D
3
R D
4
R  D
B
1
R  D
B
2
R 0 0
1D
1
R 2D
2
R 3D
3
R 4D
4
R  B1 D
B
1
R  B2 D
B
2
R 0 0
0 0 0 0 D
B1
B D
B2
B 0 0
l1D
1
R l2D
2
R l3D
3
R l4D
4
R 0 0 0 0
l1X
1
B l2X
2
B l3X
3
B l4X
4
B 0 0  X
R
1
B  X
R
2
B
l11X
1
B l22X
2
B l33X
3
B l44X
4
B 0 0  R1 X
R
1
B  R2 X
R
2
B
X1B X
2
B X
3
B X
4
B 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 X
R1
R X
R2
R
377777777777775
b :=
26666666666664
 AB5 + C3DR + C4 + C5D1R + C6D2R
C3DR + 1C5D
1
R + 2C6D
2
R
 C3DB   C4   C5D3B   C6D4B + B
 
DByB +G
unlev
B (DB)

 AR5 + R
 
DRyR +G
unlev
R (DR)

 AR5 + Z (XB) +B4
XBZ
0 (XB)
 AB5 + d^B

sXB   KyB

 Z (XR) +B4 + d^R

sXR   KyR

37777777777775
:
Thus, the solution to the remaining unknowns is given by
AB1 AB2 AB3 AB4 C1 C2 B1 B2
T
=M 1b: (A-100)
Proof of Remark 1.
72
(i) In our framework, debt characteristics (c;m; p) are chosen and xed at initiation. This setting allows
us to calculate closed-form solutions for the values of corporate securities of rms with both invested
assets and growth options, even with nite maturity debt. For given debt characteristics (c;m; p) ; the
value of nite maturity debt satises the following system of ODEs:
For 0  X  DB : 
dB (X) = B
 
XyB +G
unlev
B (X)

dR (X) = R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-101)
For DB < X  DR :8<:
(rnB +m) dB (X) = c+mp+ ~BXd
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d00B (X)
+~B
 
R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)
  dB (X)
dR (X) = R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-102)
For DR < X < XB :8>><>>:
(rnB +m) dB (X) = c+mp+ ~BXd
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d00B (X)
+~B (dR (X)  dB (X))
(rnR +m) dR (X) = c+mp+ ~RXd
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d00R (X)
+~R (dB (X)  dR (X)) :
(A-103)
For XB  X < XR :8>><>>:
dB (X) = d^B

sX   KyB

(rnR +m) dR (X) = c+mp+ ~RXd
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d00R (X)
+~R

d^B

sX   KyB

  dR (X)

:
(A-104)
For X  XR : 8<: dB (X) = d^B

sX   KyB

dR (X) = d^R

sX   KyR

:
(A-105)
d^i () denotes the value of debt of a rm with only invested assets with the same principal, coupon,
and debt maturity. The solution of d^i is given in Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006). It corresponds
to the value of innite maturity debt of a rm with only invested assets with a coupon c +mp and
interest rates rni +m. The boundary conditions for System (A-101)-(A-105) are the same as in the case
of innite maturity debt, see (A-65). Comparing this System (A-101)-(A-105) for nite maturity debt
to the corresponding System (A-60)-(A-64) for innite maturity debt, we conclude that for given debt
characteristics (c;m; p) ; the value of nite maturity debt corresponds to the value of innite maturity
debt with a coupon c+mp and nominal interest rates rni +m: Hence, the value of nite maturity debt
is given by the corresponding Formula (22) in Proposition 2.
(ii) The value of the tax shield satises the following system of ODEs:
For 0  X  DB : 
tB (X) = 0
tR (X) = 0:
(A-106)
For DB < X  DR :
rnBtB (X) = c + ~BXt
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2t00B (X) + ~B (0  tB (X))
tR (X) = 0:
(A-107)
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For DR < X < XB :
rnBtB (X) = c + ~BXt
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2t00B (X) + ~B (tR (X)  tB (X))
rnRtR (X) = c + ~RXt
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2t00R (X) + ~R (tB (X)  tR (X)) :
(A-108)
For XB  X < XR : 8>><>>:
tB (X) = t^B

sX   KyB

rnRtR (X) = c + ~RXt
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2t00R (X)
+~R

t^B

sX   KyB

  tR (X)

:
(A-109)
For X  XR : 8<: tB (X) = t^B

sX   KyB

tR (X) = t^R

sX   KyR

:
(A-110)
The boundary conditions write:
lim
X&DR
tB (X) = lim
X%DR
tB (X)
lim
X&DR
t0B (X) = lim
X%DR
t0B (X)
lim
X&DB
tB (X) = 0
lim
X&DR
tR (X) = 0
lim
X&XB
tR (X) = lim
X%XB
tR (X) (A-111)
lim
X&XB
t0R (X) = lim
X%XB
t0R (X)
lim
X%XB
tB (X) = t^B

sXB   K
yB

lim
X%XR
tR (XR) = t^R

sXR   K
yR

:
Comparing this System (A-106)-(A-110) and its boundary conditions (A-111) to the system for in-
nite maturity debt, (A-60)-(A-64), and its boundary conditions (A-65) yields that the tax shield
corresponds to the value of debt with a coupon of c and default costs of zero. The solution for the
value of the tax shield is, therefore, given by the corresponding Eq. (22) in Proposition 2.
(iii) The system for bankruptcy costs is given by:
For 0  X  DB : 
bB (X) = (1  B)
 
XyB +G
unlev
B (X)

bR (X) = (1  R)
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-112)
For DB < X  DR :8<:
rnBbB (X) = ~BXb
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2b00B (X)
+~B
 
(1  R)
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)
  bB (X)
bR (X) = (1  R)
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-113)
For DR < X < XB :
rnBbB (X) = ~BXb
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2b00B (X) + ~B (bR (X)  bB (X))
rnRbR (X) = ~RXb
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2b00R (X) + ~R (bB (X)  bR (X)) :
(A-114)
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For XB  X < XR :8<: bB (X) = b^B

sX   KyB

rnRbR (X) = ~RXb
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2b00R (X) + ~R

b^B

sX   KyB

  bR (X)

:
(A-115)
For X  XR : 8<: bB (X) = b^B

sX   KyB

bR (X) = b^R

sX   KyR

:
(A-116)
The system is subject to the following boundary conditions:
lim
X&DR
bB (X) = lim
X%DR
bB (X)
lim
X&DR
b0B (X) = lim
X%DR
b0B (X)
lim
X&DB
bB (X) = (1  B)
 
DByB +G
unlev
B (DB)

lim
X&DR
bR (X) = (1  R)
 
DRyR +G
unlev
R (DR)

lim
X&XB
bR (X) = lim
X%XB
bR (X) (A-117)
lim
X&XB
b0R (X) = lim
X%XB
b0R (X)
lim
X%XB
bB (X) = b^B

sXB   K
yB

lim
X%XR
bR (XR) = b^R

sXR   K
yR

:
This System (A-112)-(A-116) and its boundary conditions (A-117) correspond to the system for innite
maturity debt, (A-60)-(A-64), and its boundary conditions (A-65), with a coupon of zero and a recovery
rate of 1  i: The solution for bankruptcy costs is, therefore, given by the corresponding Eq. (22) in
Proposition 2.
One-regime model. Denote the default boundary by D1, the rm's investment boundary by X1, and the
default boundary of a rm with only invested assets by D^1. The system to solve is:
d (X) = 
 
yX +Gunlev (X)

X  D1
rnd (X) = c+ ~Xd0(X) + ~
2
2 X
2d00(X) D1 < X < X1
d (X) = d^

sX   Ky

X  X1:
(A-118)
This system is analogous to the one of the two regime model, (A-60)-(A-64). Similarly, the boundary
conditions are the value-matching conditions at default and exercise:
lim
X&D1
d (X) = 
 
yD1 +G
unlev (D1)

(A-119)
lim
X%X1
d (X) = d^

sX1   K
y

: (A-120)
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The functional form of the solution is
d(X) =
8><>:

 
yX +Gunlev (X)

X  D1
E3X
1 + E4X
2 +A5 D1 < X < X1
d^

sX   Ky

X  X1;
(A-121)
in which E3; E4; A5; 1; and 2 are real-valued parameters to be determined (or to be conrmed). We need
to solve for the region D1 < X < X1. By plugging the functional form (A-121) into the dierential equation
(A-118) and comparing coecients, we nd that
A5 =
c
r
(A-122)
1;2 =
1
2
  ~
~2
 
s
1
2
  ~
~2
2
+
2r
~2
: (A-123)
B3 and B4 are determined by the following two-dimensional linear system dened by the corresponding
boundary conditions:
E3D
1
1 + E4D
2
1 +
c
r
= 
 
yD1 +G
unlev (D1)

(A-124)
E3X
1
1 + E4X
2
1 +
c
r
= d^

sX1   K
y

: (A-125)
Using matrix notation and dening
M1 :=

D11 D
2
1
X11 X
2
1

b1 :=
"

 
yD1 +G
unlev (D1)
  cr
d^

sX1   Ky

  cr
#
;
we nd that
E3 E4
T
= M 11 b1 (A-126)
=
1
D11 X
2
1  D21 X11

X21  D21
 X11 D11
 "

 
yD1 +G
unlev (D1)
  cr
d^

sX1   Ky

  cr
#
; (A-127)
which completes the calculation of the solution.
The values of nite maturity debt, the tax shield, and bankruptcy costs can be found analogously to the
two-regime model (cf. Remark 1).
A.5. Details on the simulations
A.5.1. Calibration of the idiosyncratic volatility
We calibrate the rm-level idiosyncratic volatility of our BBB sample to the empirically observed total
asset volatility of 0.25. The procedure starts by simulating a model-implied economy for ten years (pre-
matching simulation). Next, we match the model-implied distribution after ten years with the empirical
cross-section of BBB-rated rms, and nally simulate the obtained matched sample for another ten years
(post-matching simulation). The average asset volatility of the post-matching simulation is then calculated.
The details of this procedure are outlined in the following paragraphs.
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We consider innite maturity debt in the pre-matching simulation for all debt maturities in the post-
matching simulation. We do so to abstract away from the impact of dierent initial principals on the results,
allowing us to analyze the pure eect of debt maturities on credit spreads in the post-matching simulation.
Additionally, starting with innite maturity debt yields initial leverage ratios (principals) close to the ones
empirically reported.35 The model-implied economy is generated as follows: Starting with a value rm
(s = 0), we generate a range of rms by increasing the option scale parameter s by steps of 0.05, up to
the largest possible value of s such that the option is not exercised immediately. At initiation, the capital
structure is chosen optimally for all rms. For each option scale parameter s; 50 rms are considered,
resulting in an initial sample of more than 3,000 rms. During the ten year pre-matching simulation of this
initial sample, rms default and expand optimally. Defaulted rms are not replaced, and exercised rms
continue as rms with only invested assets. At the end of the pre-matching simulation, we calculate the
model-implied leverage and asset composition ratio for each rm, using the assumed debt maturity and the
corresponding optimal boundaries. We obtain a model-implied economy of rms covering a broad range of
both asset composition ratios and leverage ratios.
In the second step, we match our average historical distribution of BBB-rated rms with its model-
implied counterpart. For each observation in the average historical distribution, we select the rm in our
model-implied economy at the nal period of the pre-matching simulation that exhibits the minimum distance
regarding the percentage deviation from the target market leverage and asset composition ratio. That is,
the empirical observation of a rm with leverage levemp and asset composition ratio acremp is matched
with the model-implied rm with leverage levmi and asset composition ratio acrmi if - given the set of all
model-implied rms - it minimizes the Euclidean distances
levemp   levmi
levemp
2
+

acremp   acrmi
acremp
2
: (A-128)
The nal step conducts a post-matching simulation with the obtained sample of model-implied BBB-rms
over ten years. For each simulation, we obtain the realized asset volatility for each rm, and calculate the
resulting average asset volatility over rms. When measuring and averaging asset volatilities, we incorporate
the entire initially matched BBB-sample, including the evolution of the assets of rms that default during the
ten year post-matching simulation. This approach avoids a weighting bias when averaging over simulations
towards rms with lower leverage and asset volatility, which have a smaller tendency to default during the
post-matching simulation.
The pre-matching simulation and the subsequent matching are conducted 20 times. The initial regime
is chosen according to the stationary distribution of the states. This approach also guarantees convergence
to the steady-state distribution of regimes at the time of matching. For each matched sample of rms,
the post-matching simulation is run 50 times. These numbers result in a total of 1,000 simulations. The
procedure is conducted for dierent post-matching debt maturities.
A.5.2. Simulation of the true cross-section
To ensure consistency, the simulation of the true cross-section is implemented analogously to the one
performed to calibrate the idiosyncratic volatility: We rst simulate a model-implied distribution of rms
for ten years (pre-matching simulation), and then match the model-implied distribution with the average
empirical cross-section (for details, see above). The nal step consists of simulating the matched sample
for 20 years (post-matching simulation). We assume that rms default and exercise optimally. Defaulted
35An unreported robustness analysis conrms that starting with nite maturity debt in the pre-matching simulation
yields similar results for the post-matching simulation. Credit spreads are slightly lower as the initial principals are
smaller.
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rms are not recorded after default, whereas exercised rms are maintained in the sample, and continue as
rms with only invested assets. Credit spreads and leverage ratios are measured during ve years after the
matching: For each rm in the sample, we calculate the actual credit spread and leverage every month, and
then report the average over all rms and all simulations. Default rates are observed for ve, ten, and 20
years. To assess the impact of the realized regimes at initiation and at the time of matching, we present
quantiles of post-matching average rates. As in the calibration of the volatility, the initial state is chosen
according to the stationary distribution. The pre-matching simulation is run 20 times, and the post-matching
simulation is conducted 50 times, resulting in a total of 1,000 simulations.
A.6. Financing the exercise of the growth option by issuing additional equity
We consider the case in which the exercise price K of the growth option is nanced by issuing additional
equity. The corresponding system of ODEs for corporate debt is:
For 0  X  DB : 
dB (X) = B
 
XyB +G
unlev
B (X)

dR (X) = R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-129)
For DB < X  DR : 8<:
rnBdB (X) = c+ ~BXd
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d00B (X)
+~B
 
R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)
  dB (X)
dR (X) = R
 
XyR +G
unlev
R (X)

:
(A-130)
For DR < X < XB :
rnBdB (X) = c+ ~BXd
0
B (X) +
1
2 ~
2
BX
2d00B (X) + ~B (dR (X)  dB (X))
rnRdR (X) = c+ ~RXd
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d00R (X) + ~R (dB (X)  dR (X)) :
(A-131)
For XB  X < XR :(
dB (X) = d^B (sX)
rnRdR (X) = c+ ~RXd
0
R (X) +
1
2 ~
2
RX
2d00R (X) + ~R

d^B (sX)  dR (X)

:
(A-132)
For X  XR : 
dB (X) = d^B (sX)
dR (X) = d^R (sX) :
(A-133)
The boundary conditions read:
lim
X&DR
dB (X) = lim
X%DR
dB (X)
lim
X&DR
d0B (X) = lim
X%DR
d0B (X)
lim
X&DB
dB (X) = B
 
DByB +G
unlev
B (DB)

lim
X&DR
dR (X) = R
 
DRyR +G
unlev
R (DR)

lim
X&XB
dR (X) = lim
X%XB
dR (X) (A-134)
lim
X&XB
d0R (X) = lim
X%XB
d0R (X)
lim
X%XB
dB (X) = d^B (sXB)
lim
X%XR
dR (XR) = d^R (sXR) :
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Comparing this System (A-129)-(A-133) and its boundary conditions (A-134) to System (A-60)-(A-64) with
boundary conditions (A-65), we conclude that the value of debt given that the option exercise is nanced
by issuing additional equity corresponds to the value of debt given that the option exercise is nanced by
selling assets in place with an exercise price K of zero. Hence, the value of debt in case of equity nanced
exercise costs can be calculated by the corresponding Formula (22) in Proposition 2. In particular, using
the properties of Gauss' hyperbolic function 2F1 and the denition of 
R
1;2 in (23), we nd that the function
Z (X) as stated in line 5 of (22) in Proposition 2 simplies to
Z (X) = ~RB5X
1 + ~RB6X
2 ; (A-135)
with
B5 =
s1A^B1
rnR   ~R1   12 ~2R1 (1   1) + ~R
; (A-136)
B6 =
s2A^B2
rnR   ~R2   12 ~2R2 (2   1) + ~R
: (A-137)
A.7. The equity risk premium
Proof of Proposition 3. According to Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010a), the equity premium
epi (X) is given by
epi (X) = Et [dRt   rni dt] =  Et

dRt
dnomt
nomt

; (A-138)
with
Rt :=
dei (X) + (1  ) (X   c) dt
ei  (X)
; (A-139)
and i  denotes the left limit of the Markov chain at time t. An application of Ito's lemma shows that
dRt = R;i  (X) dt+ 
e;C
i  (X) dW
C
t + 
e;P
i  (X) dW
P
t + 
e;X
i  (X) dW
X
t +

ei (X)
ei  (X)
  1

dMt; (A-140)
with
R;i (X) = i 
e0i  (X)X
ei  (X)
+
1
2

X;Ci 
2
+
 
P;id
2
+
 
X;id
2 e00i  (X)X2
ei  (X)
+
(1  ) (X   c)
ei  (X)
; (A-141)
e;Ci  (X) =
e0i  (X)X
ei  (X)
X;Ci  ; (A-142)
P;Ci  (X) =
e0i  (X)X
ei  (X)
P;id; (A-143)
e;Xi  (X) =
e0i  (X)X
ei  (X)
X;id: (A-144)
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Next, the nominal state price density is linked to the real state price density by nomt =
realt
Pt
. Hence, using
Ito's lemma, the dynamics of the nominal state price density can be written as
dnomt
nomt
=  

t +   
 
P;C
2    P;id2   P;CCi dt
   Ci + P;CdWCt   P;iddWPt + (ei   1) dMt: (A-145)
Plugging A-145 into (A-138) and taking the expectation yields the equity premium
epi (X) =
e0i (X)X
ei (X)
X;Ci
 
Ci + 
P;C

+
e0i (X)X
ei (X)
 
P;id
2   ej (X)
ei (X)
  1

(ei   1) : (A-146)
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